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 This thesis examines the Jesuit missionaries active in the region of Detroit and how their 
role in that region changed over the course of the eighteenth century and under different colonial 
regimes. Jesuits Armand de la Richardie, Pierre Potier, and Pierre du Jaunay influenced imperial 
decision-making and policy in the eighteenth-century pays d’en haut through their notable 
influence within certain indigenous communities. The priests were deeply influential during the 
French regime as demonstrated by their impact on several colonial crises discussed in the text. 
The Seven Years War and the conquest of New France by Great Britain gradually eroded Jesuit 
influence as the distrustful British were reluctant to utilize the French Catholic priests as imperial 
assets. As a result, the indigenous communities began to cut out the middlemen and deal with 
imperial Britain directly rather than through a proxy. Despite these changes, the Jesuits still 
shaped imperial realities through methods deployed under the French and new means made 
available by the conquest. Pontiac’s War brought about a conclusive end to Jesuit political power 
 in the pays d’en haut as the British, ever suspicious of the French Jesuits, completed their 
political ostracization. 
 Historians typically focus on the Jesuits of the seventeenth century when examining 
colonial North America and rarely examine how the role of the Jesuits changed during the 
eighteenth century and in different colonial contexts. This thesis seeks to demonstrate the value 
in examining this neglected aspect of colonial-indigenous alliance and diplomacy by examining 
how the Jesuits influenced several colonial crises that arose from the strategic colonial entrêpot 
of Detroit. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
From its establishment in 1701 through the British conquest of New France in 1760 and 
the early nineteenth century, Fort Pontchartrain du Détroit was perhaps the most important 
imperial outpost in the pays d’en haut, the preeminent staging ground for the western fur trade, 
and an important site for Euro-Native alliances and negotiations far beyond immediate oversight 
by colonial officials at Quebec or Montreal. Hundreds of Odawa, Ojibwa, Potawatomi, and 
Wyandot settled along the banks of the Detroit River between Lakes Superior and Erie in close 
proximity to the fort and the resident French habitants, French and British soldiers, and 
missionaries. Maintaining Native support for and attachment to the French, and later the British, 
required constant diplomacy and an uninterrupted flow of gifts and supplies to grease the wheels 
of cross-cultural alliance. Many of the pays d’en haut’s most serious crises, most notably a 1747 
plan organized by Wyandot dissidents led by Nicholas Orontony to destroy the fort and expel the 
French and Pontiac’s siege in 1763, erupted at this joint settlement. 
Key to Detroit’s operation as a critical nexus of diplomacy and cooperation was the 
presence of several Jesuit priests, most importantly Armand de la Richardie, Pierre Potier, and 
Pierre du Jaunay, who played significant roles in wide-ranging relationships and events that 
arose in the west in the eighteenth century. Histories of the Jesuits as pivotal agents of empire are 
numerous and comprehensive for mid-seventeenth-century New France, but relatively 
unexplored beyond the temporal and geographic scope of Quebec’s “heroic age.” The nature and 
extent of French North America changed enormously during the eighteenth century.1 
                                                
1 For an overview of seventeenth-century Jesuits and their actions among the Huron/Wendat, see 
Bruce G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada’s “Heroic Age” Reconsidered (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1985), especially 226-297. For the importance of Jesuits to 
alliance in the seventeenth-century, see also Denys Delâge, Bitter Feast: Amerindians and 
Europeans in Northeastern North America, 1600-64, translated by Jane Brierly (Vancouver: 
 2 
As French military and commercial endeavors pushed into the pays d’en haut, the 
colonial project changed dramatically in a geographic, cultural, and political landscape far-
removed from the St. Lawrence River. The French increasingly committed to their role as 
mediators in alliances with and among the disparate sovereign tribes of the western Great Lakes. 
Most historians examining the eighteenth-century pays d’en haut acknowledge the Jesuit 
presence, of course, but the priests’ political significance and day-to-day operations as 
ambassadors has not been closely analyzed. Studies have typically focused on military officials, 
secular diplomats, French fur traders, indigenous women, and tribal headmen while neglecting 
the ever-present missionaries. Jesuits adapted to political realities far removed from the St. 
Lawrence River as they pushed into the west. Due to the weakness of French military and 
commercial presence in North America, the Jesuits of the early seventeenth century virtually 
unchallenged by rival Frenchmen could monopolize French interactions with the Iroquois and 
Wendat tribes, but the presence in the eighteenth century of rivals like French military officers 
and an imperial program that often conflicted with the Jesuits’ priorities changed how they 
interacted with French colonial authorities and the sovereign tribes. The Black Robes’ 
missionary goals frequently interlocked with but often contradicted French imperial and colonial 
goals (themselves often at variance with one another), and it was in the intersection of a 
disjointed colonial project where the Jesuit engagement with indigenous communities and 
individuals was most important.2 
                                                                                                                                                       
University of British Columbia Press, 1993), 166-168. See also Kathryn Magee Labelle, 
Dispersed but Not Destroyed: A History of the Seventeenth-Century Wendat People (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2013), 101-102. 
2 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes 
Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 36-37, 60. Gilles Havard 
also acknowledges the role of Jesuits as diplomats, but does not examine how they influenced 
events or why they were used as diplomats. See Gilles Havard, The Great Peace of Montreal of 
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The Jesuits are in no danger of being forgotten or neglected in present-day historical 
narratives, but historians of eighteenth-century New France, Native history, and French 
colonialism elsewhere tend to narrowly assess the Jesuits as cultural arbiters in the context of 
their objections to indigenous practices and attempts to impose their moral vision onto the 
colonial and indigenous communities.3 The bulk of the historical literature about the eighteenth-
century Jesuits of French North America explores how they attempted to alter the sexual 
practices of the French and Native women and their vehement opposition to selling liquor to 
indigenous communities.4  
The Jesuits are rarely the meaningful subjects of British Atlantic and colonial histories 
except as outlandish villains. Francis Parkman exaggerated their role as the lynchpin of the 
French colonial empire and modern scholars recoil from his pronounced prejudices.5 Yet, British 
colonial officials clearly despised the French missionaries who supposedly instigated Native 
                                                                                                                                                       
1701: French Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century, translated by Phyllis Aronoff and 
Howard Scott (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001), 19-20, 95, 106. 
3 For an overview of the seventeenth-century Jesuits as cultural arbiters, see James Axtell, The 
Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 279; See also Allan Greer, Mohawk Saint: Catherine Tekakwitha and 
the Jesuits (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 7-8; Takao Abé, The Jesuit Mission to 
New France: A New Interpretation in the Light of the Earlier Jesuit Experience in Japan 
(Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, 2011), 8-8, 12. 
4 For treatment of Jesuits in French colonial historiography, see Richard White, The Middle 
Ground, 36-37; Gilles Havard, Empire et métissages: Indiens et Français dans le Pays d’en Haut 
(Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003), 302-303, 660, 705-706; Most 
discussions of Jesuits and Native women in this context concern Marie Rouensa, a Native 
woman in Illinois. For information on Jesuits, Native women, and métissage in the eighteenth-
century pays d’en haut, see Susan Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking 
Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 2001), 16-17, 23-24; Robert Michael Morrissey, Empire by Collaboration: Indians, 
Colonists, and Governments in Colonial Illinois Country (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 66-70, 77; Sophie White, Wild Frenchmen and Frenchified Indians: 
Material Culture and Race in Colonial Louisiana (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2012), 40, 131. 5"Jay Gitlin, Bourgeois Frontier: French Towns, French Traders, and American Expansion (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 10-12."
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attacks on British traders and settlers. Recent early American historians typically mention Jesuits 
either to explain the mindset of French officialdom or to contrast the Jesuits with their less 
successful British missionaries. As a result, Jesuits are surprisingly marginal to assessments of 
eighteenth-century colonial North America. Relying upon the exaggerated suspicions of British 
colonial officials, some historians have granted them a lofty but misleading station within the 
French colonial empire. Several histories of Pontiac’s War have acknowledged Jesuit influence 
in that specific event, but have not contextualized that influence with their earlier role in the 
French colonial project and discussed them as avatars of the Catholic faith that sometimes 
affected indigenous worldviews.6 The eighteenth-century Jesuits have fallen into scholarly 
purgatory where they are noted as powerful but their actual day-to-day actions in alliance-
building and diplomacy remain unassessed. 
The Jesuit diplomatic efforts functioned within (and helped to create) the structures 
elaborated upon in Richard White’s influential treatment, The Middle Ground, which explored 
how the indigenous peoples of the pays d’en haut and the French colonial government negotiated 
a space of mutual accommodation. This middle ground was maintained by a series of permanent 
forts, outposts, settlements, and kinship and commercial networks that supported regular 
communication and trade between French military and political authorities and the multitude of 
indigenous communities operating in the Great Lakes region. This mutually beneficial alliance 
                                                
6 Bruce Trigger, “The Jesuits and the Fur Trade,” Ethnohistory 12, (Winter, 1965), 30-33; David 
Weber, "John Francis Bannon and the Historiography of the Spanish Borderlands: Retrospect 
and Prospect," Journal of the Southwest 29 (Winter 1989): 354; Ann M. Little, "Cloistered 
Bodies: Convents in the Anglo-American Imagination in the British Conquest of Canada." 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 39, no. 2 (2006): 187-200; Daniel Richter, Trade, Land, Power: The 
Struggle for Eastern North America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 80, 
115, 118; Gregory Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations & the British Empire 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 20-21; Keith Widder, Beyond 
Pontiac’s Shadow: Michilimackinac and the Anglo-Indian War of 1763 (East Lansing, MI: 
Michigan State University, 2013), 53. 
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system arose from an understanding of necessary obligations between the French and the 
sovereign tribes to support one other against external threats, especially from the British and the 
Iroquois, as well as internal ones, such as schisms among the groups who constituted the middle 
ground.7  
The Jesuits of French North America are most notable for their actions during the French 
regime and it is between the years 1728 and 1752 that their influence at Detroit was most 
powerfully felt. The first chapter of this thesis will explore Jesuit Father Armand de la 
Richardie’s tenure at Detroit during this time frame. The preceding introduction will first 
investigate several Jesuit-held principles and philosophies that guided their actions in the 
eighteenth century, explain the general role of the Jesuits in the French alliance system, and 
examine the order’s history at Fort Detroit before 1728. By examining the Wyandot relocation 
and Nicholas Orontony crises that occurred between 1738 and 1751, the next chapter will clarify 
the essential role that Jesuit diplomatic initiatives played in shaping events and imperial 
functionality in the colonial pays d’en haut. 
Jesuits did not immediately disappear from the pays d’en haut after the British conquest 
of New France and Britain’s subsequent absorption of the French-Native alliance system. The 
conquest did, however, eradicate the French institutional support upon which the Jesuits relied 
for funding and political and social influence. The remaining Jesuits opted to adapt to British rule 
and worked towards stabilizing the region and demonstrating their loyalty to the new regime. 
Though severely curtailed, Jesuit clout persisted in the early years of British rule at Detroit. The 
                                                
7 White, The Middle Ground, xiv-xv, 36-37, 60; Richard White, "Creative Misunderstandings 
and New Understandings." The William and Mary Quarterly 63, no. 1 (2006): 9-11. Michael A. 
McDonnell, Masters of Empire: Great Lakes Indians and the Making of America (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 2016), 58. See also Melvin G. Holli, "The Founding of Detroit by 
Cadillac," Michigan Historical Review 27, no. 1 (2001): 132-133. 
 6 
final chapter examines how Pierre Potier and Pierre du Jaunay, the Jesuits of Detroit and 
Michilimackinac, adapted to the changing imperial realities of the Seven Years’ War, strove to 
carve out a place for themselves during British rule, and collaborated with the British during 
Pontiac’s War both through the methods they employed during the French era and new methods 
developed as a result of British claiming Detroit and the pays d’en haut. 
Lastly, the Jesuits of North America derived their influence in imperial and political 
affairs by way of their deep relationships with indigenous communities. It is impossible to 
present a meaningful history of the Jesuits and empire in North America without also examining 
the indigenous communities within which they lived and worked. While the Wyandot, Odawa, 
Ojibwe, and Potawatomi all called the Detroit River home during the eighteenth century, 
Richardie and Potier interacted chiefly with the Wyandot. This thesis will attempt to 
meaningfully engage with Wyandot history, lifeways, and social hierarchies for this reason.  
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CHAPTER 2: JESUIT POWER AT  
FRENCH DETROIT, 1728-1754 
 
 The Jesuits of Detroit were at their most powerful under the auspices of the French 
regime. Funded by the French Crown, deeply connected to the colonial government, and 
possessing a more intimate relationship with indigenous communities than almost anyone else, 
Jesuits like Father Armand de la Richardie were poised to direct the manner, for better or worse, 
in which the French colonial government interacted with the indigenous allies upon which its 
imperial clout relied. The manner in which the Jesuits inserted themselves in indigenous 
communities and affairs also gave them sway within those communities in such a way that could 
affect how they responded to political changes or tensions. Jesuit power was never absolute and 
could not totally subvert the actions or goals of either the French or the Natives, but observing 
periods in which the French-Native alliance underwent severe stress demonstrates that Jesuit 
power in the pays d’en haut could and did significantly affect historical outcomes. 
 
LES ROBES NOIRES AND CONTINENTAL INFLUENCE 
The priests of the Society of Jesus occupied an opportune position to influence the course 
of empire in the French New World. Their missions created an important foothold for future 
relations between Natives and other European entities. French authorities typically established 
fortified outposts and magazines to facilitate commercial and military operations where a Jesuit 
mission already stood. Fort Michilimackinac, one of the most important French military and 
commercial outposts in the west, was established at St. Ignace on the site of the Jesuit mission to 
the Odawa. It became central to French participation in the fur trade and to their interactions with 
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the Odawa. Jesuits were present at every treaty and stationed near every fort, serving as 
translators and diplomats in addition to their evangelization duties.1  
Notably, the Jesuits were absent from Fort Pontchartrain du Détroit for the first twenty-
seven years after its establishment. Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac founded Fort Pontchartrain du 
Détroit in 1701 and also served as its first commandant. He sold his vision for Detroit to Count 
Ponchartrain, the French Minister of Marine, through outrageous exaggeration and flattery 
accompanied by a grandiose vision of a new Eden nestled between Lake Erie and Lake St. 
Claire. An outpost on the Detroit River would allow French colonial officials to monitor all 
canoe traffic heading west on the Great Lakes. This would theoretically prevent the British from 
contacting any Native tribes in the old Northwest. Cadillac also outlined a plan to invite as many 
Native peoples as possible to relocate to Detroit, allowing for daily constant communication and 
trade between the French and the remote communities to the west. Furthermore, Cadillac’s plan 
to settle French habitants on the river to farm and mix with the Natives would strengthen 
France’s claim on the region and facilitate a closer relationship with indigenous peoples.2  
Any project to establish a settlement or outpost among the Natives necessitated some 
kind of missionary, but Cadillac and the Jesuits had already developed an intense mutual 
antipathy by 1701.3 Rather than appeal to the Jesuits for his enterprise, Cadillac instead 
                                                
1 Daniel Hechenberger, "The Jesuits: History and Impact: From Their Origins Prior to the 
Baroque Crisis to Their Role in the Illinois Country," Journal of the Illinois State Historical 
Society 100, no. 2 (2007): 90.  
2 Holli, "The Founding of Detroit by Cadillac," 134-136.  
3 Father Étienne de Carheil to Governor Louis Hector de Callières, Michilimackina, 30 August 
1702, in The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit 
Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791, vol. 65, ed. Reuben Gold Twaites (Cleveland: Burrows 
Brothers Company, 1900), 189-193, 199-201 (hereafter cited in text as Jesuit Relations). Etienne 
de Carheil, S.J., was the Jesuit missionary stationed at Michilimackinac, which Cadillac 
commanded in the 1690s immediately preceding the establishment of Detroit. Carheil personally 
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cultivated a friendly relationship with the Récollet priests, a Franciscan priestly order. The 
Jesuits accompanied Cadillac during Detroit’s first year despite their animosity, but departed 
before the end of 1701. Cadillac noted their resentment over a competing missionary order as at 
least part of their reason for departure, stating, “that the Black Robes do not speak effectively 
today because they are vexed at my bringing with me a Grey Robe [a Recollet], and because 
priests are to come who have white collars. This annoys them because they would like to be the 
only ones.” The Society of Jesus would not establish itself on the Detroit River until 1728.4 
Cadillac sold his vision for Detroit on two main pillars. Firstly, the settlement would be 
strategically significant for boxing British diplomats and fur traders out of the western Great 
Lakes and for monitoring Native travelers moving into British or Iroquoian territory. It also 
facilitated access and control over western trade, as all goods entering or leaving the pays d’en 
haut had to pass through or near Detroit, theoretically making smuggling or clandestine trading 
impossible.5 Secondly, Cadillac marketed Detroit as an experiment for future colonization 
efforts. He invited the Wyandot, Odawa, Ojibwe, and Potawatomi tribes living in the upper 
country to settle alongside the incoming French settlers and create an integrated settlement. This 
plan harkened back to France’s imperial expectations at the very beginning of its colonial 
enterprise. Officials at first looked to the francization, or “frenchification,” of the Native peoples 
already living there to offset the small number of Europeans relocating to New France. Officials 
                                                                                                                                                       
blamed Cadillac for the failure to cultivate Christianity among the Odawa because of Cadillac’s 
unrestricted sale of brandy to the regional tribes. 
4 George Paré, The Catholic Church in Detroit, 1701-1888 (Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, 1950), 144. For the quote, see Jacques Valois, “Delhalle, Constantin,” in Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography, vol. 2, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 1974. 
5 Richard Weyhing, “‘Gascon Exaggerations’ – The Rise of Antoine Laumet dit de Lamothe, 
Sieur de Cadillac, the Foundation of Colonial Detroit, and the Origins of the Fox Wars,” French 
and Indians: In the Heart of North America 1630-1815 (Detroit: Michigan State University 
Press, 2013), 95-96. 
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and clerics believed they could frenchify the continental interior by incentivizing Native 
communities to adopt French agricultural, linguistic and religious practices. In doing so the 
French could stake their claim to the North American interior with a negligible European 
population and secure the interior against inroads from other European rivals.6 
The Jesuits had rejected francization as a viable missionary strategy by the 1650s. Rather 
than bring the Natives into a closer relationship with Christianity, the Jesuits saw the close 
contact with the French necessary for francization as harmful to Native communities and 
especially harmful to Christian living. The union of French men and Native women in the façon 
du pays was seen as an illicit sexual relationship outside the bounds of proper marriage, an 
irregularity the priests decried often and loudly. Perhaps their biggest concern was the threat 
European alcohol posed to Christian morality. Jesuits complained of years of missionary work 
and steadfast Christian faith lost in the excesses of a single night of drunken revelry. Jesuit 
rejection of francization does not, however, represent a rejection of colonialism or empire. The 
Jesuits felt that this method of colonization undermined their missionary efforts and instead 
pursued methods that they felt could facilitate alliances with the French without exposing the 
Natives to the bad moral example of the French.7  
                                                
6 Saliha Belmessous, "Assimilation and Racialism in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century 
French Colonial Policy." The American Historical Review 110, no. 2 (2005): 322-49. France did 
not consider racial differences a barrier to becoming loyal subjects of the Crown. Concepts of 
race and nationality in the pre-French Revolution world were far more fluid than they would 
later become. 
7 Carheil to Callières, Michilimackina, 30 August 1702, in Jesuit Relations 65: 191-193. Carheil 
considered French sexual liaisons with Native women to be the other most damaging activity 
towards his mission; See also Robert Michael Morrissey, “The Terms of Encounter: Language 
and Contested Visions of French Colonization in the Illinois Country, 1673-1702,” French and 
Indians in the Heart of North America, 1630-1815 (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University 
Press, 2013), 47-49. 
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Jesuits of the eighteenth century pursued an unorthodox and aggressively syncretic mode 
of evangelization to secure the future of North American Christianity. Syncretism in this context 
refers to how the Jesuits adapted their message to more cleanly fit within Native structure and 
spirituality rather than impose a strictly Eurocentric Christianity. They largely rejected the state 
as a Christianizing tool and instead tried to cultivate their own personal Christian garden among 
the Natives. Their vision for Native Christianity placed the Jesuits themselves as the sole 
Europeans present among the sovereign tribes as the primary conduit through which Christian 
revelation and European civilization flowed. This also entailed chasing away the wolves that 
threatened their flock, often manifested as other Europeans whose drunkenness, sexual 
impropriety, and reckless pursuit of wealth, the priests alleged, undermined their Christian 
nurseries. The Jesuits would have ideally submitted all congress between Natives and Europeans 
to their purview and act as the ultimate arbitrators of frontier civilization in their authority as 
North America’s ordained moral guardians.8  
The Jesuits firmly believed that their divine prerogative to bring the New World into the 
Catholic faith superseded all other European colonization goals. They protested loudly at any 
intrusion that they felt jeopardized their mission. They did not, of course, oppose colonization or 
European settlement at all times or even most of the time, but the Jesuits saw themselves as 
                                                
8 The Spanish Franciscans in La Florida and New Spain pursued a similarly syncretic strategy for 
the tribes to which they ministered. See Robbie Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw: The 
European Invasion and the Transformation of the Mississippian World, 1540-1715 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2010) 78; For more information on French Jesuit missionary 
techniques, see Catherine Randall, Black Robes and Buckskin: A Selection from the Jesuit 
Relations (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 5; Peter A. Goddard, "Canada in 
Seventeenth-Century Jesuit Thought: Backwater or Opportunity?" in Decentring the 
Renaissance: Canada and Europe in Multidisciplinary Perspective 1500-1700, ed. Germaine 
Warkentin and Carolyn Podruchny (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 190-191; Sara 
E. Melzer, Colonizer or Colonized: The Hidden Stories of Early Modern French Culture 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 108-109.  
 12 
primarily interested in their indigenous flocks’ spiritual well being and took to their task with 
this goal in mind. They supported and praised French settlement and colonization when they 
believed it would aid them and opposed it when they saw European involvement as a liability.9 
The tribes at Detroit remained without a missionary to minister to their spiritual needs 
until the Wyandot specifically requested one in 1728 as a result of their objections to the post 
commandant, Alphonse de Tonty. Tonty had been appointed in 1717 and immediately abused his 
authority, exploited the French settlers, and drove up prices to line his own pockets. By 1727 the 
Detroit tribes had had enough. The Wyandots petitioned the governor of New France to remove 
Tonty and open up trade at Detroit to afford them better prices and better aid to the French. 
Though their request to remove Tonty was made moot by his death, the governor recognized 
their grievances and took pains to assuage them. Notable among these grievances was the 
Wyandot request for a Jesuit missionary to be permanently stationed among them. The governor 
responded immediately and Armand de la Richardie, who had previously ministered to the 
Wyandot’s kin in New France, was dispatched to the Detroit River in 1728.10 
Why did the Wyandot respond to Tonty’s abuses with a specific request that a missionary 
be stationed among them? One cannot discount that some of the Christian Wyandot simply 
wanted a priest to minister to their spiritual needs, much like any French parish without a pastor. 
But there were additional benefits to entertaining a missionary that the Wyandot’s early 
experiences with European religion had taught them, even for the Wyandot who preferred their 
                                                
9 Kelly L. Watson, Insatiable Appetites: Imperial Encounters with Cannibals in the North 
Atlantic World (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 124-125.  
10 For Tonty’s abuses of power, see “Petition from Detroit Citizens to Recover Their Rights,” 
Detroit, 1727, in Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society Collections, vol. 34, ed. The Society 
… (Lansing, MI: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co., 1905), 38-40 (hereafter cited in text as 
MPHC). For the Wyandot petition, see Huron tribe to Beauharnois, Detroit, 9 August 1727, in 
MPHC 34: 49-51. See also White, The Middle Ground, 177-178. 
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own spiritual customs. The Wyandot had encountered Christianity before almost any other 
sovereign tribe and had enjoyed close relations with the Jesuits long before their relocation to 
Detroit. Jesuits interacted with their assigned communities on a face-to-face basis, and thus 
possessed intimate details of the inner workings of the tribes. The respect that Jesuit priests 
received from French officials made them excellent liaisons through which the Wyandot could 
strategically transmit their grievances and expect a rapid response.  
 
MISSIONARY IN THE MIDDLE GROUND 
 Father Armand de la Richardie learned valuable lessons in Native customs and reciprocal 
power relations in his early years at the Detroit settlement that he later applied during the 
upheavals and crises of the 1740s. His efforts to win sway among the Wyandot and to convert 
them to Christianity are particularly important because they demonstrate exactly how a 
missionary’s methods could affect the entire tribe. Richardie would later apply the lessons 
learned in his early years of evangelization to influence the Wyandot during and after the 
Orontony crisis.  
 Richardie characterized his initial time spent among the Wyandot as frustrating and 
fruitless: 
When I arrived here I found not a single savage professing the Christian faith, although 
some of the older ones, while suffering from sickness, had formerly been washed in the 
sacred waters by the first missionaries. About forty years ago, shaking the dust from their 
feet, they had abandoned that nation, which was uncircumcised in heart.11 
                                                
11 Richardie to Retz, Mission de l’Assumption, 21 June 1741, in Jesuit Relations 69: 49. The 
phrase ‘uncircumcised in heart’ would mean that the tribe had closed itself off from God’s 
influence. Circumcision was a physical representation of the Israelites’ covenant with God. To 
be “uncircumcised in heart” thus represents the Wyandot’s supposed refusal to participate in the 
covenant between God and the Catholic Church. The phrase is common in both the Old and New 
Testaments of the Christian Bible. Richardie also quotes the Gospel of Matthew with the phrase 
“shaking the dust from their feet,” an act Jesus commanded his apostles to do when a home or 
 14 
 
In this account, written in the midst of French-Wyandot tensions in 1741, Richardie exaggerates 
their situation to make the case for his own exemplary behavior as a missionary. Earlier visitors 
to Detroit like Pierre François Xavier de Charlevoix in 1721 had characterized the Wyandot as 
Christian but lacking a missionary. The Wyandot had been the first large indigenous confederacy 
in the Northeast to accept Christianity and, judging by their specific request for a missionary in 
1727, they wished to continue in their practice of that faith. Charlevoix’s reports on Detroit in 
1721 noted that the majority of the Wyandot professed at least some form of Christian faith, with 
only a few of the elders resisting conversion. Richardie did not start with as infertile a garden as 
he would have had his superiors believe. The challenges Richardie faced instead seem to stem 
from his struggle to be accepted by the Wyandot as a spiritual leader. Richardie interpreted the 
tribe’s reluctance to accept his spiritual authority as paganism writ large.12 
Despite these exaggerations, Richardie still managed to deepen his bond to the tribe and 
its power structure. Wyandot society organized itself into three main groupings called phratries 
and subdivided into nine clans. The phratry chiefs acted as the principal chiefs of the Wyandot 
with the clan leaders acting as auxiliaries. The clans further subdivided into cabins that could 
hold anywhere between four and forty tribespersons. Wyandot elders and the leaders of 
individual longhouses were influential in their clans and a valuable foothold for any European 
entity hoping to establish itself within the community. Richardie approached these powerful 
                                                                                                                                                       
town refused to welcome them or pay heed to their words. Richardie thus compares his Jesuit 
predecessors to the apostolic founders of Church and expresses contempt for the “uncircumcised 
of heart” that supposedly rejected their message.  
12 “Charlevoix at Detroit,” in The Windsor Border Region: Canada’s Southernmost Frontier; A 
Collection of Documents, ed. Ernest J. Lajeunesse (Toronto: Champlain Society for the 
Government of Ontario, 1960), 26-27. 
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tribal leaders to strengthen his position within the tribe and hasten their acceptance of him as 
their spiritual guide.13 
The Jesuit priests, in the pays d’en haut as in the Wyandot homeland of Wendake, often 
depended on Native women to influence the men of the tribe to adopt Christianity. Wyandot 
women did not hold official positions of power or speak at councils, but items and proposals 
could not be addressed unless a woman, typically an elder, chose a man to act as an advocate and 
present her concerns before the tribe. Jesuits in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries tried to 
convert the tribes they visited and did so by winning over particularly powerful orators, elders, 
and chiefs. This first required the Jesuits to win over an influential woman who could then 
convince a headman to advocate for conversion on her behalf. By acting through the female 
elders and their male proxies, Jesuits attempted and often succeeded in converting a tribe by way 
of its power structure rather than trying to specifically win over the people on an individual 
basis.14 
Richardie won great influence with the Deer clan, the preeminent Wyandot clan led by 
the Wyandot principal chief, Sataretsy. He was formally adopted into the Deer clan and enjoyed 
a successful streak of baptisms in his early years among them. Wyandot women played a central 
role in his acceptance within tribal confidence as only the women could request an outsider be 
                                                
13 John L. Steckley, The Eighteenth-Century Wyandot: A Clan-Based Study (Waterloo, ON: 
Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2014), 77-80. 
14 Women were often the Jesuits’ fiercest advocates. Wyandot men assumed more power and 
influence in the colonial age, but Christianity, and thus the Jesuits, offered new avenues for 
women to influence the tribe. Wyandot women were often a conduit through which the men of 
the tribe converted to Christianity. For information on the importance of women in tribal council 
procedure, see Labelle, Dispersed but Not Destroyed, 162-165. 
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adopted as fictive kin. While Richardie exaggerated his own success among the Wyandot, he still 
managed to secure an influential position in the tribe by way of its embrace of Christianity.15 
Beyond his capacity as a spiritual emissary for the Catholic Church, Richardie also 
played a noteworthy role as an emissary for the French colonial state. In serving as an emissary 
for the French, Richardie acted as both the arbiter of French imperial goals and a constant 
negotiator for the nature of the father-child diplomatic obligations of the French-Native 
alliance.16 Richardie’s daily interactions with the Wyandot and strong ties to its power structure 
made him a one-man consulate through which the French could both transmit and receive 
requests to and from the Wyandot. The French waged war against the Mesquakie tribe, whom 
the French called the Foxes, through the 1730s and depended on the allied tribes settled at or 
near Detroit to pressure and attack them. Pierre Jacques Payen de Noyan depended on Richardie 
to gauge tribal sentiments during the Fox Wars, writing to the French colonial minister, “The 
hurons and the Outawas [Odawa] of detroit, whom I Commanded, have caused father de la 
richardie to write to me several times that they Were ready to follow me.” De Noyan’s 
communications with the Ministry of Marine cite Richardie as the French informant on tribal 
attitudes and as the medium for expressing military commitment to the French alliance. The 
                                                
15 Steckley, Eighteenth Century Wyandot, 77-78. Adoption into a tribe allowed a missionary 
greater access to the people and a heightened degree of acceptance amongst the tribesmen. The 
pursuit of formal adoption had become standard practice for Jesuit missionaries by the mid-
seventeenth century in New France. For more information, see Axtell, The Invasion Within, 83-
85. 
16 Andrew Sturtevant touched upon Richardie and his successor’s ability to influence the 
Wyandot tribe in brief, though he was mostly concerned with the Wyandot themselves. See 
Andrew K. Sturtevant, “Jealous Neighbors: Rivalry and Alliance Among the Native 
Communities of Detroit, 1701-1766,” PhD diss., College of William and Mary, 2011, 185-186; 
Michael Witgen, An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North 
America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 52; White, Middle Ground, xi, 
40. 
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Wyandot and Odawa are specifically noted as dispatching Richardie to transmit messages on 
their behalf.17 
 
WYANDOT RELOCATION 
 Intertribal disputes on the Detroit River disrupted the relative stability the region had 
enjoyed since the end of the Fox wars in the early 1730s. Conflict erupted between the Wyandot 
and Odawa that threatened to throw the entire Detroit enterprise into disarray. The Odawa 
implicated the Wyandot for leaking information about an Odawa raid against a southern tribe 
that resulted in several Odawa deaths. The Odawa held the Wyandot personally responsible for 
their losses, claiming to have witnessed a Wyandot warrior at the battle killing a close relative.18 
  Tensions became so heated that the Wyandot feared for their safety at Detroit and 
beseeched the French to intercede on their behalf. The official commandant, Jacques Payen de 
Noyan, was not actually present at Detroit at this stage and operated primarily through a proxy, 
seasoned colonial officer Nicolas-Joseph Denoyelles. Governor Charles de Beauharnois, De 
Noyan, and Denoyelles attempted to pacify the two tribes with gifts and protection, but these 
promises did little to assuage Wyandot fear or Odawa anger. The Wyandot had maintained a 
small clearing near Sandusky Bay on the southern shore of Lake Erie as a winter settlement. 
Against their usual customs, the entire tribe left for Sandusky during the 1738-1739 winter for 
fear of attack by the Odawa. Richardie, asserting that he understood the Wyandot mind, wrote to 
                                                
17 De Noyan to Maurepas, Minister of Marine, 1731, in Collections of the State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin, vol. 17, ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites (Madison, WI: The Society, 1906), 122 
(hereafter cited in text as WHC). 
18 Beauharnois to Maurepas, Quebec, 11 October 1738, in MPHC 34: 151-154. See also White, 
The Middle Ground, 193. Other tribes in the west in the eighteenth century were also identified 
as “Flatheads” or the French “Têtes-plates.” Richard White identifies the Flatheads of this 
scenario as the Catawba, a tribe from the Carolina Piedmont region.  
 18 
Beauharnois that, “the Huron [Wyandot] will not be easily reassured and that [Richardie] has a 
compelling reason to think they may defect to the Sonontouans [Seneca] or flee to the belle 
Rivière [Ohio River].”19 Denoyelles went to Sandusky Bay in February 1739 and promised 
complete Wyandot safety at Detroit. Nicholas Orontony, an early and active Wyandot convert to 
Christianity and leader of the Porcupine clan, met with Denoyelles upon his return to Detroit and 
requested on behalf of the tribe that the French allow the Wyandot to relocate and settle closer to 
the French.20  
 Interim Commandant Denoyelles demonstrated a general ignorance of Wyandot tribal 
structure and internal power dynamics. Firstly, he identifies Orontony as “the great chief of that 
tribe,” when that title belonged to Sastaretsy. Orontony was a minor leader and directly 
subordinated to a man named Anguirot, who headed the Turtle phratry. Orontony was prominent 
among the Wyandot, but he acted only as an emissary and had no standing to make decisions for 
the whole tribe at this time. Denoyelles and Commandant De Noyan, when he finally arrived to 
assume his post, would repeatedly refer to him as one of the three great chiefs of the Wyandot. 
This misunderstanding of Orontony’s authority within the tribe, when coupled with successive 
weak attempts to placate Wyandot fears and Odawa anger, marks a recurring pattern of French 
ignorance of Wyandot politics and concerns. Beauharnois, Denoyelles, and De Noyan 
subsequently deferred to Richardie and other Jesuit priests for their information regarding the 
tribe and to relay their concerns.21 
                                                
19 Beauharnois to Maurepas, memorandum, Quebec, 1741, in WHC 17: 279-280 . 
20 Denoyelles to Beauharnois, Detroit, 1 February 1739, in MPHC 34: 163-164. “Orontony” was 
a Wyandot title meaning “Warpole.” He was baptized by Richardie in 1732 and received 
“Nicholas” as his baptismal name. Texts refer to him using either one name or the other, rarely 
both. 
21 Ibid. 
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Losing faith that the French would come through for them, some among the Wyandot 
began to scout other options. Richardie struggled to assert control over these discussions, 
ultimately relying on his Native supporters and friends. He relied upon the female Wyandot 
elders on at least one occasion to prevent a flight to Seneca territory in western Pennsylvania. At 
some point during the retreat to Sandusky, the Wyandot dispatched an emissary to make 
overtures to the British and exchanged a wampum belt as a form of semi-official treaty. 
Departing Detroit and arriving at Sandusky brought the Wyandot further away from French 
observation and closer to potential British overtures. Thus, their flight to Sandusky indicates both 
misgivings about French protection and an openness to ally with the British. While the Wyandot 
did not reject the French, they sensibly played the field to negotiate for a better option.22 
 Though Richardie initially supported relocating the Wyandot closer to Quebec or 
Montreal, he began to steer events on a course of his own choosing by 1740. His letter to Father 
Saint-Pé, the Jesuit Superior of New France, in 1740 demonstrates a meaningful if patronizing 
and disdainful understanding of Wyandot customs. The Wyandot daily asked Richardie to write 
to the governor on their behalf in the hope that he would aid them in their relocation. Though 
Beauharnois and De Noyan, having finally assumed his post, were both at this point ready to 
relocate the Wyandot to Montreal, they had neither satisfied Wyandot tradition nor their actual 
desired place of relocation. Richardie wrote: 
There is no Change in their project of going to Settle near you. The only thing that 
Hinders the Carrying out of the project, is Savage vanity that does not wish to appear to 
flee, and seeks to Conceal its fear, by saying to the neighboring Nation, that they are 
being taken from their fire, in order that another may be kindled for them. I am urged 
daily to Induce Monsieur the General to send a message by which he will Remove them 
                                                
22 Sturtevant, “Jealous Neighbors,” 184-185; “Conrad Weiser Journal,” in Minutes of the 
Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, vol. 5 (Harrisburg: Theo. Fenn & Co., 1851), 351 (hereafter 
cited in text as PCD). The precise details of this overture are uncertain, but it was certainly 
initiated by either Anguriot or his lieutenant, Orontony. 
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from here and settle near him. This is but a pretext. The Truth is that they wish it to be the 
people of the Sault or of the Lake [Sault St. Louis and Lac des Deux Montagnes, both 
near Quebec]. The latter are no friends of mine as you might imagine. Thus, if Monsieur 
the General wishes to Grant their prayer, the people of the Sault must be their agents and 
their deputation must come here next spring to exercise the gentle pressure that is 
desired.23 
 
 This letter between Richardie and Saint-Pé reveals both Richardie’s goals and motive 
during the crisis and his willingness to act against French designs in order to pursue his own 
purposes. The tribe refused to relocate for fear of showing weakness of submission. Relocation 
would permanently mark them as French dependents and cripple their ability to negotiate 
autonomy in their new location. They would lose face to the other tribes allied with the French, 
especially the Odawa.24 In order to preserve their elevated standing with the French-Native 
alliance, the Wyandot insisted on relocating only for the well-being of their wives and children 
with proper decorum and only if a good place was prepared for them beforehand among their 
kin. Richardie recognized these designs to maintain their tribal sovereignty, derisively decrying 
their “savage vanity.” Though he understood Wyandot motives, he saw their attempts to 
maintain ritual sovereignty as disobedient. Realizing that the Wyandot would only relocate on 
their own terms, Richardie recommended that emissaries from the Laurentian Iroquois settlement 
at Sault St. Louis, also called Kahnawake, would be necessary to induce the tribe to relocate.25 
The letter to Saint-Pé further reveals Richardie’s agenda in these affairs: to monopolize access to 
the Wyandot for evangelization. He concluded his missive to Saint-Pé by writing: 
                                                
23 Richardie to Saint-Pé, Mission de l’Assumption, 26 August 1740, in WHC 17: 328.  
24 Neta Crawford, “A Security Regime among Democracies: Cooperation among Iroquois 
Nations,” International Organization 48, no. 3 (1994): 357-359. These fears of lost status were 
not unfounded. When the Haudenosaunee [Iroquois] Confederacy formally adopted the refugee 
Tuscarora tribe as its Sixth Nation, it did so without granting them an equal voice in the 
Confederacy’s decisions. They did not have a seat on the Great Council and were not allowed to 
elevate sachems. They were granted nominally equal rights, but not equal power. 
25 Steckley, Eighteenth-Century Wyandot, 78-80; Richardie to Saint-Pé, Mission de 
l’Assumption, 26 August 1740, in WHC 17: 328. 
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It is that, to allay their continual alarms, [the governor will] allow them to establish 
themselves three leagues from here on an island called grosse isle. There, they say, as 
they will see no more Outaouacs [Odawa], they will be a little more in peace. Not-
withstanding the Labors entailed by a New Establishment I am in accord with their 
desires, convinced as I am that their destruction is manifest, and will never be due to 
anything but their proximity to and their mingling with the French and faithless nations.26 
 
 A Sulpician missionary named François Piquet, whose order Richardie referred to as “no 
friends of mine,” ministered to the Natives of the Lac de Deux Montagnes. The Jesuits resented 
any interference in their mission, even from other Catholic missionaries, and rejected any 
arrangement that they felt would endanger their vision for a garden of Christianity shepherded by 
the robes noires alone. Richardie felt that close proximity to the French’s bad example and, 
perhaps more importantly, their alcohol, would become a lethal blight for the Christian harvest. 
On the other hand, relocating the Wyandot to the Lake of Two Mountains would remove them 
from Jesuit authority. Staying at Detroit was equally unacceptable, both for the danger it 
represented and its proximity to the “faithless Nations” of the Anishinaabe. Grosse Isle 
represented a novel solution for the priest. The island was close enough to Detroit to supply 
Richardie’s mission, but theoretically distant enough to guarantee Wyandot safety. The Wyandot 
would stay removed from the French without moving them closer to the British by way of 
Sandusky Bay. Any French authority figure other than Richardie would be at least a day’s canoe 
ride away, allowing Richardie to monopolize access to the tribe. Richardie had more sustained 
daily contact with the Wyandot than any other Frenchman, having spent seven months during the 
previous winter at the Sandusky Bay village, and had more opportunity to campaign for his own 
vision for the Wyandot than any other European. Because most petitions the Wyandot made of 
                                                
26 Ibid. 
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the French were communicated through the priest, his control of the message allowed him to 
undermine certain authority figures.27 
 As this dispute persisted, fissures opened up within the Wyandot tribe itself. The quarrel 
elaborated the conflict between Anglophile and Francophile elements within the tribe. The three 
phratry chiefs disagreed on whether or not to relocate. Sastaretsy and Tayetchatin, leaders of the 
Deer and Wolf phatries, favored relocating to be closer to the French. Anguirot, leader of the 
Turtle phratry, supported remaining in Sandusky. Anguirot was the phratry leader who initiated 
the first retreat to Sandusky Bay after the initial tension with the Odawa. Richardie despised 
“The Drunkard Angouirot” and tried to exclude him from councils and tribal decision-making as 
much as possible. He further isolated Anguirot by building stronger ties with Sastaretsy and 
Tayetchatin and siding with them as they faced growing dissent from the young men of the 
tribe.28 It often fell to Nicholas Orontony, as Anguirot’s most prominent subordinate, to fill the 
gap left by the exclusion of the phratry’s leader.29 Despite Richardie’s attempts to exclude him, 
Anguirot remained an influential voice within the Wyandot with whom the French had to reckon. 
When Governor-General Charles Beauharnois sent his nephew, Claude-Charles de Beauharnois, 
                                                
27 For antipathy towards the Sulpicians, see Richardie to De Jaunay, Sandusky, December 1741, 
in WHC 17: 371; For primitive Christianity, see Goddard, “Canada in Seventeenth-Century 
Jesuit Thought,” 194; For “faithless Nations,” see Richardie to Saint-Pé, 26 August 1740, WHC 
17: 328. For seven months at Sandusky Bay and Richardie as a conduit for Wyandot petitions, 
see Beauharnois to Maurepas, Quebec, 1 October 1740, in MPHC 34: 180-184. 
28 For “Drunkard,” see Richardie to Saint-Pé, Mission de l’Assumption, 26 August 1740, in 
WHC 17: 328. For Richardie’s support of the Wyandot elders against the young men, see 
Richardie to Saint-Pé, 10 June 1741, in WHC 17: 339. 
29 Steckley, Eighteenth Century Wyandot, 83-85. Steckley theorizes that Richardie intentionally 
elevated Orontony as the voice of his phratry as a way to undermine Anguirot’s position to the 
French. Orontony was an early convert and an active godparent in the Wyandot baptismal 
records. Ultimately, the records are insufficient to make a definite statement over Richardie’s 
intentions for Orontony, but the younger Wyandot definitely looms larger in the records, even 
before 1747. At the very least, Richardie undercutting Anguirot gave Orontony more opportunity 
for prominence and influence within the tribe. 
 23 
to negotiate relocation with the Wyandot, he transmitted an order to Richardie to stop 
undermining the chief: 
Several persons have told me that you did not like him[Anguirot]; that you would not 
admit him to any Council; that his people had spoken and he had said nothing; and that 
when he saw me he would show me that he has reason to complain because you represent 
him to me as a dangerous and pernicious individual. On an occasion like this it is 
advisable, rather, to appear to have confidence in him, so as not to disgust him, and thus 
to induce him not to thwart my purpose.30 
 
 Beauharnois dispatched his nephew to Detroit to organize a secret council with the 
Wyandot followed by a general council of the Odawa, Potawatomi, and Ojibwa to finalize 
Wyandot relocation. He was tasked to relocate the Wyandot as soon as possible, either before 
winter fell or immediately after it ended. Governor Beauharnois also requested that Richardie 
assist his nephew, Chevalier Claude-Charles de Beauharnois to the best of his ability to finalize 
the relocation. Though the governor had expressed misgivings regarding Richardie’s dealings 
with Anguirot, he expressed explicit trust that both the Chevalier de Beauharnois and the Jesuit 
would carry out the task as envoys of New France.31 
 The mission did not go as planned. A nearly empty Wyandot village greeted the 
Chevalier de Beauharnois upon his arrival in late June, with only Anguirot and a few other elders 
remaining. His initial prognosis was grim. The Wyandot seemed almost entirely demotivated to 
relocate to the east. The Chevalier attempted to loosen Anguirot’s lips with liquor in keeping 
with his reputation, but the old chief moderated himself and acted with “a cunning and subtle 
mind, the ability of an accomplished politician.” The Chevalier spent a month on the Detroit 
River visiting the other tribes and the few Wyandot who remained before departing to Sandusky 
                                                
30 Beauharnois to Richardie, Quebec, 14 June 1741, in WHC 17: 349. 
31 For the Chevalier’s orders, see Charles Beauharnois to Claude-Charles Beauharnois, Quebec, 
12 June 1741, in WHC 17: 346. See also Beauharnois to Richardie, 14 June 1741, in WHC 17: 
349. 
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Bay to treat with the bulk of the tribe. A new idea to settle at the nearby Grosse Isle had grown to 
such a level that the Chevalier saw it as another major obstacle by the time he departed for 
Sandusky Bay in August with Richardie in tow.32 
 Suspicious of the Chevalier’s friendship with the Sulpician missionaries, Richardie 
appears to have done all he could to sabotage his mission to relocate the Wyandot. Swearing, 
“the hurons will never wish to have any other Missionaries than us,” Richardie quarreled with 
the Chevalier for fear that he might threaten the Jesuit hegemony on missions to the tribes. In his 
letters to a fellow Jesuit, Father du Jaunay, Richardie criticized both the Chevalier and the 
Governor’s incompetence in dealing with the affair. Though the Chevalier returned to the 
Governor with Sastaretsy, Tayetchatin, and Orontony in tow, Richardie was convinced these 
negotiations would go nowhere. Richardie also lied about non-existent orders from Beauharnois 
to reestablish his mission on Grosse Isle.33 
 The disarray sewn by Richardie, combined with the internal discord among the Wyandot 
elders and young men, scuttled the tribe’s motivation and the French ability to relocate them. 
The disagreement between the elders and the young men of the tribe as well as the swell of 
contradictory rumors confused and paralyzed the relationship with the Wyandot. Beauharnois, 
having by September 1742 procured some of Richardie’s letters to his fellow priests, laid the 
blame squarely on the Jesuit: 
The conduct of the Chiefs toward my nephew, did not originate with them, but Was 
inspired by their Missionary, and I can give you no better proof of this, Monseigneur, 
than to Send you an Extract from his Letter Written to Father Du-jaunay in the month of 
December, 1741, wherein the whole Mystery is unveiled, and the proof thereof results 
from Information I have Had.34 
                                                
32 Claude-Charles Beauharnois to Governor Beauharnois, Detroit, 2 August 1741, in WHC 17: 
353-355. 
33 Richardie to De Jaunay, December 1741, in WHC 17: 371. 
34 Beauharnois to Maurepas, 15 September 1742, in WHC 17: 413. 
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 Forced to abandon his plan for Grosse Isle, Richardie petitioned the Wyandot to settle at 
Bois Blanc Island and the adjacent coast a few miles south of Detroit. He reestablished his 
mission on Bois Blanc Island and, by 1744, had succeeded in attracting a large portion of 
Wyandot Christians to settle nearby. But Richardie’s success in attracting members of the tribe 
to Bois Blanc Island came at the expense of tribal unity. While Sastaretsy, Tayetchatin, and their 
cohort relocated to Richardie’s mission at the mouth of the Detroit River, Anguirot, Orontony, 
and their cohort for the most part remained at Sandusky Bay. By 1744 Governor Beauharnois 
could report that an uneasy peace had fallen on the Detroit River.35 
Richardie played a significant but sometimes subtle and complex role in the relocation 
from 1738 to 1743. He was the primary and most prolific conveyor of Wyandot anxieties and 
grievances to the French and was trusted by both the tribe and colonial officials to communicate 
the goals and intentions of all involved. Yet even at his most earnest he represented the Wyandot 
in a way that isolated one of the three major chiefs as a bad moral influence. He undermined the 
plans for relocation desired by both the French and the bulk of the Wyandot when he came to 
believe it would threaten both their Christian morality and Jesuit spiritual hegemony on the 
Detroit River.   
 Despite Richardie’s significance in this affair, the priest was not a leader in the events 
that transpired. He wielded power to influence but never to control their outcome. He likely 
projected much more influence on French actions than on the Wyandot ones because of his 
control over the information the governor received. His representations of Wyandot petitions, 
both honest and deceitful, confused and ultimately paralyzed French officials when his undivided 
                                                
35 Beauharnois to Maurepas, 9 October 1744, in WHC 17: 440-441; See also White, The Middle 
Ground, 194-196. 
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support could have made the relocation efforts far more effectual. The French actors, 
governmental and religious, typically reacted to initiatives and movements originating from 
either the Wyandot or one of their neighbors and could never direct the happenings around 
Detroit. The paralysis of the French in turn strained the Wyandot and opened cracks in tribal 
unity as anxiety over their safety and future pulled the tribe apart. The priest never controlled the 
tribe, but his actions helped to create the context within which they had to act. Undermining 
Anguirot created the opportunity for the younger Nicholas Orontony to fill a power gap and 
establish both clout and credibility within the tribe. Though Richardie’s efforts to move the 
Wyandot to a more remote location on the Detroit River partially succeeded, his actions 
contributed to a tribal schism and set the stage for events he could not have anticipated. 
 
KING GEORGE’S WAR AND THE EVE OF CRISIS 
 While the French blundered about in their negotiations in the pays d’en haut, tensions 
with the British escalated into King George’s War in 1744. Though the early fight was confined 
to the Atlantic coast, British colonial officials sought to expand their influence by inducting new 
member tribes into their Covenant Chain, or the Anglo-Iroquois alliance system. Orontony had 
led a delegation from the Sandusky Wyandot to Albany and established a trade relationship with 
the British in 1743. Despite these overtures to the British, Orontony and the Sandusky Wyandot 
gave no indication they were willing to go to war against the French or permanently break with 
their brethren. Richardie, with the aid of a newly arrived Belgian Jesuit named Pierre Potier, still 
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ministered to the tribe at the Sandusky settlement and split his time between the Detroit River 
and Sandusky Bay.36   
 Nicholas Orontony took the reins as effective leader at Sandusky and forged a more 
formal alliance with the British and Iroquois by 1745. Sandusky hosted the westernmost British 
trading house for furs and liquor where Wyandot and British traders travelled freely between 
Sandusky Bay, New York, and Pennsylvania. By Orontony’s own words, many of the Wyandot 
had become disaffected with the French, resented unequal power balance with the French, and 
saw the opportunity for cheaper goods offered by British traders. He outlined this disaffection in 
his meeting with the British agent Conrad Weiser in 1748, who wrote: 
their coming from the French was because of the hard Usage they received from them; 
That they would always get their Young Men to go to War against their Enemies, and 
wou’d use them as their own People, that is like Slaves, & their goods were so dear that 
they, the Indians, could not buy them.37 
 
 The French, with Father Richardie’s aid, took steps of their own to secure an edge in 
Native alliances. Together with some allied Mohawks from Kahnawake, the French launched a 
devastating raid on the British and Iroquois settlement at Saratoga in November of 1745 as an 
exhibition of French might and to dispel British rumors that the French would soon be expelled 
from the Great Lakes.38 Richardie prepared a speech for the Wyandot near Sandusky to assure 
them that the French would be the winning horse in the coming conflict and that the Wyandot 
should beseech their kin to reject the British and stay loyal to France. Longueuil, the Detroit 
commandant at this time, depended on Richardie to convey his message for the tribe, as 
                                                
36 For Orontony’s visit to Albany in 1743, see Steckley, Eighteenth-Century Wyandot, 85-86. For 
Richardie and Potier’s cooperation, see George Paré, “Pierre Potier, S.J.” Canadian Catholic 
Historical Association, Report 18 (1950): 51-52. 
37 “Conrad Weiser Journal,” PCD 5: 350-351. 
38 Longueuil to Beauharnois, 28 July 1745, in WHC 17: 446-447. 
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Longueuil could not speak Wyandot.39 Richardie translated Longueuil’s message and sent it to 
Potier to be delivered near Sandusky with a personal postscript. As much as Richardie clashed 
with colonial authority during the relocation affair, he disliked the idea of the Wyandot allying 
with Protestant England even more. He affirmed all of Longueuil’s statements and appealed to 
their love for the missionary to return to the Detroit River, saying: 
My children, all that was said is true. Be his [the governor’s] children again where he is 
found. Take courage and return to this country [Detroit], where there are no bad tidings. 
Undertake this endeavor that we may see each other again soon, my brothers and sisters 
of blood. I love you all with all my heart, without exception, and I salute you.40 
 
The elders responded immediately after hearing this speech, promising that all would 
soon return to join the Wyandot of Bois Blanc Island on the Detroit River. They included a 
personal response to Richardie himself that they would return to him to the place “where there is 
no bad news.” The old priest collapsed from a stroke soon after dispatching Potier, was stricken 
by paralysis, and forced to depart for medical treatment to Quebec, leaving the inexperienced 
Potier in charge of the mission as tensions swelled in the pays d’en haut. 41  
Though Potier ministered briefly to the Wyandot settlement at Lorette prior to his arrival 
at Detroit in 1744, he had little direct experience with tribal and colonial negotiations. Potier 
spent the winter at or near Sandusky but reported his work slow and ineffective. Potier’s mastery 
                                                
39 Robert Toupin and Pierrette LaGarde, Les Écrits de Pierre Potier (Ottawa: University of 
Ottawa Press, 1996), 588-589 (hereafter Pierre Potier); for Longueuil’s linguistic barrier, see 
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41 The Huron to Longueuil, 5 Avril 1746, in Pierre Potier, 594. 
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of the Wyandot tongue extended only to writing and delivering prepared speeches, stunting his 
ability to connect with the tribe.42 
 Meanwhile, tensions continued to escalate due to King George’s War. The assault on 
Saratoga enraged the Iroquois who retaliated and went to war against the French. The Wyandot 
at this point had strong ties to the Iroquois, ties strengthened and formalized during Orontony’s 
diplomatic overtures in 1745. Fearful that the Wyandot would side with the Iroquois and bring 
the fight to Detroit and perhaps doubtful of Potier’s ability to smooth things over, Richardie 
penned an address to the tribe from his sickbed. He beseeched the tribe both as a representative 
of the French and as their spiritual father, “Again I say obey, my children. Remember the way of 
the elders who continually encouraged one another to say: ‘We will be strengthening this country 
for a long time when we will attach ourselves to the governor.’”43 
 Potier was well aware of both the escalating tensions and his own shortcomings in 
dealing with them. He appears to have arrived at the novel solution to kill two birds with one 
stone by collecting the first ever census of the Detroit and Sandusky Wyandot. Compiling such a 
census would have brought Potier into contact with nearly every person in the Wyandot tribe. 
Potier would have had ample opportunity to practice the tribal tongue and would familiarize 
himself with the tribespersons on a personal, face-to-face level. Because he compiled this census 
in the first months of 1747 Potier created a glimpse of the tribe and its dispersal immediately 
prior to the breaking point of Orontony’s plan. 
                                                
42 Potier to Saint-Pé, March-April 1747, in Pierre Potier, 624. Despite time in Lorette and two 
years at Detroit, by 1747 Potier was only beginning to “stammer out a bit of Huron (Je rougis de 
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43 Richardie to the Hurons, 29 December 1746, 1 April 1747, in Pierre Potier, 620-623, 
translation from French by the author of this article. 
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The census reveals that over two thirds of the Wyandot resided, or at least maintained a 
residence, on or near Bois Blanc Island. Though they still wintered at Sandusky, the faction that 
permanently moved to that area were firmly in the minority. Nicholas Orontony himself 
maintained a residence on the Detroit River in the same village as Sastaretsy and Tayetchatin. 
Orontony thus had ample opportunity to coordinate with the Anishinaabeg and Miami tribes in 
the area and foment discontent with the French among those tribes. It also shows that Anguirot 
had very recently died, leaving Orontony as the most prominent voice and undisputed leader in 
the pro-British faction of Wyandot.44  
Richardie, even from distant Quebec, could see the writing on the wall. He so feared for 
Potier’s safety that he tried to have him forbidden from wintering at Sandusky and wrote the 
Jesuit superior of New France to enforce this desire. Richardie felt he would be healthy enough 
to return to Detroit by the first snowfall and aid in deescalating the tension. Potier, partially 
because he wanted to improve his Wyandot and partially from an earnest will to commit to his 
post, refused to abandon the mission unless the tribe ordered him away.45  
  
CRISIS AND RESOLUTION 
 Nicholas Orontony devised a plan to destroy Fort Pontchartrain and expel the French 
from the pays d’en haut. The plan seems to have been to assault the Mission of the Assumption 
on Bois Blanc Island and either kill or capture Potier. The mission would then have been used as 
                                                
44 For the census itself and an analysis in French, see Toupin and Potier, “Les Villages Hurons. 
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a staging ground to assault and capture Detroit. The plan went awry, however, when a few 
Wyandot at Sandusky acted too early, killing five Canadian traders from Detroit and ransacking 
their wares. A Native woman, either a Miami or Wyandot, travelled to Bois Blanc Island and 
tipped off the missionary, who fled to Fort Detroit as Orontony approached.  Longueuil put the 
post on high alert, first banning all indigenous people from the fort and subsequently prohibiting 
them from carrying weapons within or near the fort. Sastaretsy and Tayetchatin disavowed 
Orontony’s attack and swore allegiance to the French before departing for Quebec to confirm 
their loyalty. Officially disavowed by the two most preeminent leaders of the Wyandot and 
unable to carry out his initial plan, Orontony burned the Bois Blanc Island mission to the ground 
and fled with a portion of his followers to Sandusky.46 
 The other tribes of the pays d’en haut began lashing out in the confusion. The Odawa, 
Potawatomi, and Ojibwa also killed and robbed several French traders in or near Detroit and 
Michilimackinac. The Miami chief Memeskia captured and ransacked the French Fort des 
Miami. The British and their Iroquois allies sent agents to foment discontent among the French 
allies and broaden the Covenant Chain. Colonial officials saw Orontony as the originator in the 
greatest crisis of the French alliance system since the Fox Wars. They saw pacifying the 
perceived originators of the conflict as an essential first step to pacifying the region as a whole.47 
 Longueuil called a council at Fort Pontchartrain in August 1747 to ascertain from the 
Wyandot how to pacify the region. Their chief request was that Richardie return to Detroit as 
soon as possible to aid in the reconciliation process. Both Sastaretsy and Tayetchatin sickened 
                                                
46 For an account of the initial killings and the exposure of the conspiracy, see “Revolt of the 
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and died from disease contracted during their diplomatic visit to Quebec, meaning that with 
Anguirot’s death in early 1747 and Orontony’s flight, the entire upper hierarchy of the Wyandot 
tribe evaporated in less than a year. Richardie also had a history of siding with the elders of the 
tribe when disputes arose with the younger members, so Richardie’s return would help the elders 
consolidate authority both with the French and the younger warriors at a time when clear 
leadership was desperately needed. For all his earlier manipulations, the priest was still respected 
and influential to the Wyandot. Richardie himself had wanted to return to Detroit almost as soon 
as he departed and agreed immediately, departing from Montreal for Detroit on September 10.48 
 French authorities, pressured by the Atlantic coast campaigns, relied on Richardie to 
bring the dissident Wyandot back into the fold as essential to pacifying the frontier. One officer, 
Charles Deschamps de Boishébert, wrote to the French minister: 
Should affairs not be arranged by Father Richardie, ancient missionary of the Hurons, 
who is going to form a new establishment in that country, Canada would be to be pitied; 
we should be in need of great assistance from France to support ourselves here.49 
 
Colonial officials did not place all their hopes on Richardie, however. Orontony received visitors 
from the Miami, turned away those answering Longueuil’s call for allies, and continued to 
entertain British tradesmen at Sandusky with Longueuil unable to take action against him. The 
governor sent a convoy of weapons, ammunition, and 150 soldiers to hold down the fort until 
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Richardie arrived. If Richardie could not restore the peace, the governor at least hoped the troops 
and arms would help Longueuil repel an attack.50 
 Richardie arrived at Detroit in October with a delegation of French officers, Wyandot 
elders, and Kahnawake Mohawks to restore peace to the area. He appealed to the Wyandot with 
ecclesiastical language, assuring that all could be forgiven if the tribe abandoned Orontony but 
promising excommunication for all who persisted in their rebellion. As even Nicholas Orontony 
was a practicing Christian, the language of sin and absolution was an especially powerful 
assertion. Orontony reached out for potential reconciliation and visited Bois Blanc Island himself 
in November 1747. Richardie was willing to absolve Orontony of his actions and welcome him 
back into the fold, even officiating a marriage ceremony between Orontony and a Wyandot 
woman on November 19. Orontony’s overtures of reconciliation may have been genuine, but 
negotiations had fallen through by March 1748, when the dissident chief burned the village at 
Sandusky and retreated inland to be closer to the British. He reaffirmed his ties to the British in a 
meeting with Conrad Weiser in Pennsylvania, ending all attempts at negotiation.51  
 Though Orontony permanently split from the French-Native alliance, Richardie 
succeeded in preserving most of the Wyandot as allies at Detroit. He convinced the French-
aligned Wyandot to relocate to La Pointe-de-Montréal in 1748, directly across the river from 
Fort Pontchartrain, and received 5,000 livres from the government to establish a new mission.52 
He and Potier left Orontony to his devices, at least pleased that he stayed away from the rest of 
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the Wyandot while persisting in his alliance with the British.53 An uneasy silence fell over the 
pays d’en haut. Orontony maintained a strong diplomatic and trade relationship with the British, 
but the Wyandot headman never took major action against the French.54 
 Nicholas Orontony died from disease sometime before September 1750, but his followers 
remained in exile near the Vermillion River. Richardie endeavored to convince the sundered 
branch of the Wyandot tribe to rejoin their kin in the French-Native alliance. He left in early 
September of 1750 with a few French porters and Wyandot companions. A flurry of rumor and 
fear erupted immediately in the tribe. A group of elders left the mission to intercept Richardie 
and turn him back from his mission. An elder named Babi confessed to believe that Orontony 
had beseeched the dissident Wyandot to kill any Frenchmen who came to meet them, even the 
Black Robes. Their fears convinced Potier and the Detroit commandant to send messages of their 
own, begging Richardie to return for fear of his life, but Richardie pressed on and met the 
“Nicholites” at a neutral ground a short way from their camp.55 
 Richardie met remarkable success. The Jesuit wintered among the Wyandot for two 
months, competing for their attention with two British tradesmen stationed who warned the 
village against committing to the French in order to maintain a trading relationship. The 
Wyandot ransacked the British trading outpost, pillaged the supplies, and shipped them to 
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Detroit for sale. Richardie convinced several of the elders and young people to depart for Detroit 
immediately and extracted promises from the rest to return after winter.56 
 Richardie went to Detroit in the spring of 1751 alongside most of the Wyandot dissidents. 
Not all of Orontony’s followers returned to their kin that year, but the French believed their 
kinship bonds would pull them back together quickly. This proved prescient as all of the 
dissidents had either returned to Detroit and the French alliance or fled the country to join either 
the Iroquois or the Miami by the onset of the French and Indian War in 1754.57 
As for Richardie, the priest believed that the first wave of returns in 1751 marked the 
completion of his task. He departed Detroit in the summer and retired to Quebec and died there 
in 1758. The mission passed to Potier, who ministered to the Wyandot and the newly arrived 
French habitants. Potier remained at Detroit until his death in 1781, living at a nexus of colonial 
power during the French and Indian War, Pontiac’s War, and most of the American Revolution. 
Potier would be a key actor on the contested French, First Nations, and (later) British and 
American landscape, carrying forward the lessons learned from observing his predecessor.58  
 
CONCLUSION 
 Richardie’s long and influential tenure as a missionary among the Wyandot at Detroit 
from 1728 to 1751 is representative of the Jesuits’ importance in the eighteenth century pays 
d’en haut. His extensive training and facility with Wyandot language and customs made him a 
particularly well-qualified and effective envoy for French colonial interests. Moreover, his 
personal familiarity with almost every local tribal member made him an skilled negotiator and an 
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invaluable source of information for the French. His efforts to evangelize and minister to the 
Wyandot were central to his ability to insert himself into Native customs and power structures 
and to his attempts to further inject his own spiritual and related colonial objectives.  
 Yet it is essential to understand the limits of Richardie’s influence in the pays d’en haut. 
He was more influence to French leaders than Native ones. He could communicate indigenous 
concerns and express grievances to colonial officials, but Wyandot leaders consistently took 
matters into their own hands their needs were unmet. Though Richardie convinced dissident 
Wyandots to reenter the fold, he could not trump Nicholas Orontony’s influence while the man 
still lived. The Wyandot were never pawns subject to orders and requests by the missionary or by 
French authority. Richardie may have met different results in the winter of 1750 had Sastaretsy, 
Tayetchatin, Anguirot, and Orontony not all died within such a short timeframe. 
 Still, it is important to emphasize that Richardie and most Jesuits had their own agenda 
that often did not align with French colonial aims. He cooperated with the French during the 
Orontony crisis from 1747 to 1751, but he actively undermined the governor and his agents 
during the relocation affair. He supported French attempts to keep the Wyandot away from 
Protestant and British influence, but he scuttled French plans when they interfered with Jesuit 
intentions. Richardie and his religious order were, first and foremost, concerned with winning 
souls for Roman Catholicism, not with creating subjects for the French king. They jealously 
guarded their mission from actions perceived to challenge their spiritual authority. Governor 
General Beauharnois astutely noted in a letter to the Minister of Marine that, “It will be easy for 
you to see that those Fathers want to have a share in the Government, which is very pernicious 
inasmuch as they make the savages act according to their Ideas and their interested views.”59 
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CHAPTER 3: JESUIT ADAPTATION AND DECLINE DURING  
THE BRITISH REGIME, 1754-1765 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Richardie could not have known, but his impact during the Wyandot separation crisis 
would prove to be the high watermark of Jesuit influence in the North American interior for the 
remainder of the eighteenth century. The tumultuous 1750s would begin a long period of 
disruption in the pays d’en haut and in the Jesuit missions around the world. The French, with 
Jesuit aid, were able to contain the dire situation with their Native allies by 1751, but the 
eruption of hostilities in 1754 with Washington’s attack on Fort Duquesne and the start of the 
Seven Years’ War marked the beginning of the end for French power in the west. The British 
conquest of Quebec in 1760 and the cession of Louisiana to Spain in 1762 brought an end to 
French imperial influence on the North American continent. The consequences and unanswered 
questions left by this turnover would later spark Pontiac’s War in 1763 and begin the 
accumulation of tensions that flamed into the American Revolution in 1775. On top of these 
disruptions, the Jesuit missionaries also experienced an additional crisis when the French Crown 
announced the order’s expulsion from all French lands, obliterating their institutional support.1  
 These important turns of event had major consequences for the Jesuits priests still active 
in the hinterlands in the 1750s and 1760s. This section will focus on two priests in particular who 
were active in two of the most important sites of French imperial power in North America before 
1760 and for Pontiac’s War and British imperial rule afterwards. Father Pierre Potier, now fluent 
in the Wyandot tongue, and Father Pierre du Jaunay, the Jesuit missionary to the converted 
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Odawa at Michilimackinac who ministered to his converts at nearby L’Arbre Croche. Both of 
these priests saw their mission change when the hardships of the Seven Years’ War and their 
assigned tribes’ increasing activism diminished their influence in imperial affairs as their 
diplomatic power decreased. The conquest and departure of French imperial sponsors saw their 
institutional support evaporate entirely while British distrust of the interior French and especially 
the black-robed missionaries further removed them from a position of power. Nevertheless, the 
Jesuits were keenly aware of their vulnerability in the new order and took measures to preserve 
their positions within their frontier communities and even attempted to reclaim their earlier status 
as ambassadors for the colonial system. The imperial crisis of Pontiac’s War and the Jesuits’ 
closeness to the Odawa and Wyandot allowed them to preserve their place despite Britain’s open 
hostility to their order. They demonstrated themselves to be of some strategic importance as they 
worked alongside British military officials to pacify the belligerent tribes.2  
 Despite the potential strategic value Jesuit priests stood to offer to the new colonial 
regime, British perceptions that they were actively subverting rather than aiding British 
imperialism and changing political realities within the Anglo-Native alliance system prevailed. 
This, combined with the Jesuit expulsion from Louisiana in 1763 and the dissolution of the order 
in the 1770s, brought an end to Jesuit political and diplomatic clout in the pays d’en haut. 
Though Potier would remain at Detroit until his death in 1781, the Jesuit presence in the west 
changed from missionary activity and diplomacy to a depowered position as parochial for the 
French settlers.3  
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SEVEN YEARS’ WAR  
 The Orontony Crisis and King George’s War proved pivotal moments in New France’s 
strategy for the pays d’en haut. The violence of the crisis and British inroads into the Ohio River 
Valley during the war convinced the French Crown and the New France government to double 
down on their commitment to the Franco-Native alliance and to their presence in the west. The 
governor commissioned Chaussegros de Léry to visit and renovate the western fortresses and 
ordered the construction of new forts at Sandusky, Presque Isle at the mouth of the Detroit River, 
and, most famously, Fort Duquesne. The commandants saw their budget for diplomatic gifts and 
supplies to the Native tribes increase substantially. This included financially supporting an 
expanded Jesuit mission at Detroit to better fund their missionary and diplomatic activities 
among the Wyandot in order to more strongly secure the tribe’s ties to France.4  
This increased commitment also saw a concerted effort to place French habitants in 
settlements like Detroit and Michilimackinac in the pays d’en haut. The colonial government 
offered free land and financial support to any families who moved into the western settlements. 
Dozens of families moved to the banks of the Detroit River to take advantage of this opportunity 
and settled primarily on the southeastern shore near Potier’s Jesuit mission. Rather than trek 
across the river every Sunday to attend church at Fort Detroit, the newcomers instead opted to 
worship at the mission house alongside the Wyandot converts. French and Wyandot worshiped 
side by side with Potier combining his traditional role as missionary with his new role as a pastor 
to the French newcomers. Potier endeared himself to these new arrivals, making him an 
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influential leader within the French community at Detroit that considered him a “saint on 
Earth.”5 
 Potier’s growing prominence with the French came corresponded to a decline in his 
influence among the Wyandot. The swell of French settlers into indigenous territory brought 
with it the traditional problems of frontier colonization. The Wyandot complained that the 
settlers sometimes staked their claim to land that the tribe had not formally donated to the 
French.6 Though Potier attained a stronger command of the Wyandot language, the Wyandot 
nevertheless began to employ the services of a new translator, one St. Martin. No evidence 
suggests Wyandot hostility to the priest himself, but Potier’s new responsibilities to the swell of 
French settlers, in addition to the new tensions the settlers brought with them, contributed to a 
decline in trust between the French and the Wyandot that saw them less willing to use Potier as a 
go-between.7  
 These tensions accompanied an even bigger shift in Wyandot politics as the Seven Years’ 
War took its course. With his death in 1747, Sastaretsy’s title was passed down to a successor of 
a decidedly less French-exclusive foreign policy. The faction within the Wyandot desirous of a 
stronger alliance with the Iroquois reemerged after its brief submersion following Orontony’s 
death. The new Sastaretsy chose to reinforce Wyandot bonds to the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant 
Chain that Nicholas Orontony had formalized in his dealings with the British. The French called 
a council at Detroit in January 1754 as the competition for the Ohio River Valley sharply 
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escalated tensions. Not only did the Wyandot refuse to affirm their support for a French war 
effort, they also tipped off the Iroquois that the Odawa and the other Anishinaabeg were 
amassing for war.8  
Nonetheless, French officials managed to secure some level of support from the Detroit 
tribes until the later years of the war as French supply shortages strengthened Sastaretsy’s 
rhetoric. A Wyandot-hosted Seneca observed a council at Detroit whereby the French 
commandant had managed to gather support for a raid against the British. Sastaretsy, however, 
vehemently refused to entertain this agenda and shouted the other tribes down, saying: 
I am surprised at your Conduct & Readiness to take up the French Hatchet, without 
considering the Consequence, especially as I gave you a Caution, before we entered the 
Fort or Council Room of the French. He then added. How can I, who am the Flesh and 
Blood of the Six Nations and in whose Towns Numbers of our Friends & Children are 
living and settled, declare War against them. Where are there any of the Nations now 
present, that are not allied to the Six Nations also. To take up the Hatchet against them, 
wou'd in my Opinion be wrong.9 
 
Observers testified that Sastaretsy was so persuasive that he silenced the French rallying cry at 
that meeting and convinced the Detroit tribes to stand down for the time being. The French 
continued to call the Detroit tribes to arms again in early 1759 and, though some eventually 
joined the French during the siege of Fort Niagara, the Wyandot in particular were noted to wish 
to remain “tranquil on their mats.”10 
 Nicholas Orontony’s actions in 1747 demonstrated the potential influence the Wyandot 
could wield on the Franco-Native alliance. This influence would only grow as the French and 
Indian War progressed. The Odawa had long reigned as France’s most powerful ally in the pays 
d’en haut, but the Wyandot became ascendant in the 1750s as demonstrated by the effectiveness 
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of Sastaretsy’s speech and his insistence on neutrality. The Wyandot alone among the French-
aligned communities of the pays d’en haut possessed a strong political and kinship connection to 
the Iroquois and became a powerful voice for neutrality during the war. This voice became more 
and more convincing as the British blockade and supply shortages dried up the flow of French 
gifts that fueled their alliance. The acute supply shortages rendered the Wyandot and even the 
Odawa eager for the conflict to end and for trade to be reestablished through the British.11 
 With growth in Wyandot power also came a renewal of internal division. Many Wyandot 
opposed strong ties to the Iroquois and the British, instead opting for exclusive ties to their long-
standing allies, the French. Though the tribe generally trended towards neutrality during the war, 
the pro-French faction was powerful enough to send warriors to fight for the French in the later 
stages of the war despite the nadir of the French supply flow. Pro-French Wyandot fought during 
the siege of Fort Niagara in 1759, losing warriors to the violence and deepening the bitterness 
many of them felt toward the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant Chain. Though this internal tension did 
not manifest as a split as it had during the Orontony Crisis, rising internal disagreement 
accompanied the rising Wyandot influence and the turbulent political situation in the pays d’en 
haut. Many of the Wyandot reestablished themselves once again at Sandusky both to provide a 
permanent location near the new French fort and to network with tribes like the Delaware and 
Shawnee as well as to more easily receive visits from the Iroquois.12  
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 While the internal conflict during Richardie’s tenure created opportunities for the old 
priest to influence the tribe, the stronger emphasis on Wyandot neutrality and a heightened 
position of power among the pays d’en haut communities diminished Potier’s power within the 
tribe. The Wyandot no longer needed a direct line to the French colonial power structure in the 
form of a Jesuit priest. They now communicated through their translator, St. Martin, or directly 
with the commandant at Fort Sandusky if they had demands for the French. The pro-British 
Wyandot so insisted on retaining St. Martin’s services that they extracted a promise from the 
British detachment sent to claim Detroit after the conquest over two weeks before they were due 
to arrive. They could now assert themselves to the other tribes without relying upon the French 
and had less need for French clout as they grew closer to the British and Iroquois and adopted 
neutrality. Potier’s influence continued to diminish as his financial support from New France 
decreased because of the financial strain of the war. Nevertheless, Potier remained a prominent 
member of the Wyandot community at Detroit and Sandusky in his capacity as their missionary. 
Ties to the British and distance from the French did not diminish their fervor for the Catholic 
faith. Conversion to Catholicism appears to have been close to total by 1760 and the Wyandot 
continued to embrace Potier as a pastor even as their diplomatic activism meant they no longer 
had use for him as a diplomat.13  
 
 
THE NEW ORDER: 1760-1763 
 With the fall of Montreal in 1760, the Seven Years’ War came to its conclusion. With 
that conclusion came the immediate withdrawal of the French imperial presence from Quebec 
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and the pays d’en haut and its eventual withdrawal from French Louisiana. The peace and 
transfer of power was discussed and handled exclusively between the French and the British. No 
representatives from indigenous communities took part in the transfer even though they were an 
important topic of discussion. The French Crown recognized the conquest of New France by the 
British and withdrew from the pays d’en haut, but their Native allies had not been conquered.14 
 French military officials at Detroit tried to ensure a smooth transfer of power when it 
came time for them to depart. Commandant Belestre, a French-Canadian born at Detroit and its 
final French commander, held a council with the Wyandot, Odawa, Ojibwa, and Potawatomi 
tribes a few days before Colonel Robert Rogers would claim Fort Detroit for the British. Belestre 
informed the tribes of his orders from Governor Vaudreuil to turn Detroit over to the British 
peacefully. The French settlers had been guaranteed their property and their right to practice their 
Catholic faith. He told the tribes that the British had promised to take over from their French 
father and attend to them as well and faithfully as the French had before them. But even Belestre 
did not believe that the British would deal evenly with the Natives. He departed Detroit with his 
French soldiers in December 1760, ashamed to abandon his home and his longtime allies.15  
 Potier’s future was even less certain than that of the interior French or the Wyandot. The 
departure of the French meant that the financial support that had fallen to a trickle during the war 
would now be suspended indefinitely. Protestant Britain would certainly never have funded a 
Catholic mission in conquered New France. More than that, the British government hated the 
Jesuits more than perhaps any other entity in North America, seeing them as the manifestation of 
all their problems in the continental interior. They believed the French, and especially the Jesuits, 
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to be at the heart of every hostile inclination directed at the British. The interior French, they 
believed, continually roused Native warriors to raid the interior and thwart Britain’s colonial 
ambitions. Reflecting on the challenges of his early years as Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Sir 
William Johnson saw in the Jesuits a symbol for all difficulties for British expansion, writing: 
The French in order to reconcile them to these encroachments, loaded them with favours, 
and employed the most intelligent Agents, of good influence, as well as artful Jesuits 
amongst the several Western and other Nations, who by degrees, prevailed on them to 
admit of Forts, under the Notion of Trading houses in their Country, and knowing, that 
these posts, could never be maintained contrary to the inclinations of the Indians, they 
supplied them thereat with Ammunition and other necessaries in abundance, as also 
called them to frequent Congresses, and dismissed them with handsome presents.16 
 
British officials were incapable of believing that the Natives could raise the hatchet 
against the British without some puppet master pulling the strings. Though they universally 
distrusted the French habitants, their antipathy towards the Jesuits was special. No European, 
French or British, had managed to insert themselves more fully into indigenous communities 
than the Jesuits. They had lived and worked among the Natives for over a century and had 
succeeded, in many cases, in ensuring that the tribes who embraced Catholicism would stay 
strongly attached to the French.17  
British missionaries rarely approached Jesuit missionary success in winning converts and 
imperial allies. The British, as did many of the Native tribes, understood that Jesuits had 
represented a commitment to ally militarily and politically with the French and against the 
British.18 British colonial officials constantly complained of the vexatious Black Robes rousing 
the interior against them. This reputation as Indian rabble-rousers even became a motivation to 
                                                
16 Sir William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, Johnson Hall, November 1763, NYCD 7: 575. 
17 “The Expediency of Securing Our American Colonies,” in Collections of the Illinois State 
Historical Library, vol. 10, ed. Clarence Walworth Alvord (Springfield, IL: Illinois State 
Historical Library, 1909), 159 (hereafter cited as IHC). 
18 Havard, Empire et Métissage, 706; Axtell, Invasion Within, 83-85. 
 46 
ramp up colonization for some in order to combat their influence. One pamphlet entitled “The 
Expediency of Securing Our American Colonies” summarized the overall attitude of the British 
Empire towards the Jesuit missionaries with the following statement: 
These unjustifiable proceedings afford very plausible arguments to the French Jesuits and 
Priests, who, like Satan, whose creatures they are, love to fish in muddy waters, and are 
ever rambling in these parts,  — to create jealousies and suspicions; widen breaches 
however occasioned; inflame the revengeful spirits of these cruel savages, whom they 
still abuse; and in short, to persuade them, that our design is, to expel all the natives, and 
take possession of the whole country:  A notion, with which they seem to have been 
strongly impressed of late; but by whom, is no mystery.19 
 
For many British officials, the first order of business after conquering New France was to 
expel all French settlers, fur traders, and especially the Jesuits from the interior. They believed 
that control of the west could not be secured unless these dangerous subversives were removed 
immediately. Therefore, the new regime held little promise of friendliness for the Black Robes. 
Anxiety over their vulnerability in the face of institutional hostility motivated Potier and Du 
Jaunay in the years of conflicts and crises to come to prove their worth to British colonial 
officials and thus prevent their expulsion.20  
 At first, the fear of expulsion compelled some Jesuits to flee to Upper Louisiana into 
French-held territory. This included Potier and the other Jesuit stationed at Detroit, Jean-Baptiste 
Salleneuve, and Jean-Baptiste de la Morinie, the missionary to the Potawatomi at St. Joseph. 
Salleneuve and Morinie never returned to their posts, but Potier, either from a sense of obligation 
to his charges or prescient awareness of the international situation of the Jesuit order, returned to 
Detroit before September of 1761 and was received “amid the greatest manifestations of joy by 
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his friends and with utmost humanity by the British General.” 21 Potier’s return from exile proved 
incredibly fortuitous when the Superior Council of Louisiana decreed the Jesuit order to be 
dissolved on July 9, 1763. All the Jesuits in Upper Louisiana, including Salleneuve and Morinie, 
were seized and expelled from the colony with only the clothes on their backs and a few books. 
Britain did not dissolve the Jesuit order in Canada until the order’s global dissolution by papal 
decree in 1773. Thus, Potier and Du Jaunay, the last remaining Jesuits in the pays d’en haut, 
were left with allegiance to the regime as their only option.22 
 Because the British recognized Detroit’s strategic importance, they made the fort the 
command center for the entire pays d’en haut alliance system. Sir William Johnson, the British 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the northern colonies, paid a visit Detroit in September of 
1761 to smooth over some of the tensions that had arisen in the west. The regime change had left 
many of the tribes in doubt as to their status and to how the new alliance system would function. 
The indigenous communities were eager for a resumption of trade and for the flow of gifts that 
had been disrupted by the Seven Years’ War. Some felt threatened by the new order, with tribes 
like the Ojibwe of Michilimackinac and the Odawa at Detroit losing the favorable status they had 
enjoyed with the French regime. These tribes especially resented the British efforts to humble the 
tribes and relegate them to a submissive position. Others saw this new order as an opportunity to 
advance themselves in the new imperial context.23  
 The Wyandot tribe split between Detroit and Sandusky found itself in a better position 
than any other outside the Iroquois Confederacy to take advantage of the new regime. Though a 
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portion of the tribe remained firmly anti-British and anti-Iroquois, the prominence and power of 
the pro-Covenant Chain faction and the tribe’s kinship ties to the Iroquois allowed them to 
position themselves as the intermediary between the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant Chain and the 
former French-allied tribes of the pays d’en haut. The British even recognized the Wyandot as 
the head of the Detroit River confederacy of tribes and communicated both their potential as 
British allies and the danger they posed as an influential enemy. Other sources saw the Wyandot 
as strong allies who were well-disposed to the British and effective intermediaries.24 
Sir William Johnson’s visit to Detroit in September 1761 testifies to the intricacies of the 
Wyandot position in the pays d’en haut and Potier’s new position within the alliance system. 
Immediately after his arrival at Detroit, fifty Wyandot women and two headmen greeted Johnson 
and gifted him with corn and other food goods. Johnson held a conference with all the tribes of 
the western Great Lakes, including the Wyandot from Detroit and Sandusky, to address their 
grievances with the new system, assure them of his respect, and grease the wheels of alliance 
with a multitude of gifts. Many Wyandot, already well-disposed to the British and the Iroquois, 
received him happily, but tensions persisted with others. A fight nearly broke out between the 
Wyandot and the Seneca present at the conference and only Johnson’s mediation and liberal 
distribution of gifts prevented an altercation. Ultimately, Johnson parted ways with the Wyandot 
on good terms, but the tensions present at the meeting did not dissipate.25  
While Richardie had been central to councils and conferences like this under the French 
regime both as a participant and a translator, Potier did not play an active part in the negotiation. 
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Due to both the British distrust of Jesuits and because Wyandot ascendancy had cut out the need 
for a middleman in the form of a missionary, Potier was relegated to the sidelines in this affair. 
Johnson hired St. Martin for interpretation rather than rely on Potier, who is not recorded as 
having participated at all. Potier did manage to secure some face time with Johnson, however, by 
inviting the man to dine with him at the mission. Johnson was charmed enough by the Jesuit to 
personally invite him to a ball for the well-to-do habitants and French traders.26 He also made 
sure to visit and dine with Potier whenever he visited the Wyandot village to meet with the 
Wyandot chiefs. Whether or not Potier offered any counsel on dealing with the Wyandot is not 
recorded, but Johnson ended his visit convinced of the “favorable disposition” of the habitants 
and the Jesuit despite his earlier conviction of the untrustworthiness of both parties.27 
The tense situation in the pays d’en haut seemed to have stabilized after Johnson’s visit, 
but tribal anger reignited in 1762 when Henry Gladwin took over as the commandant of Detroit. 
Gladwin, much like the Governor-General, Jeffrey Amherst, held a very low opinion of the 
indigenous peoples. He resented Britain’s inability to conquer the tribes and made it clear in his 
dealings with them that he believed them inferior and foolishly arrogant for thinking otherwise. 
He, as did other commandants at Amherst’s behest, stopped the flow of gifts the tribes believed 
were the bare minimum of an alliance. He refused to lower the prices on trade goods to the 
competitive levels the British had earlier promised to the tribes. Worse still, his interactions with 
the Detroit tribes were contemptuous at best, as he disdained of all Natives and strove to 
subjugate the tribes through British rule rather than alliance. In one famous example, he 
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publically executed an enslaved Native man in order to send a message to all Natives to fall in 
line with British rule or else suffer the consequences.28  
A similar pattern emerged throughout the Great Lakes region as tension rose between the 
tribes and the British. The Shawnee, Mingo, and Delaware resented both British rule and their 
own vassalage to the Iroquois. They felt threatened by the influx of British settlers in 
Pennsylvania and near the Ohio River who squatted on Native land and disrupted their 
communities through the sale of destructive alcohol. The Odawa and Potawatomi of Detroit and 
the Ojibwe of Michilimackinac resented the British for their heavy-handedness and feared that 
they would be reduced to thralldom under a British yoke. A Delaware spiritual leader, Neolin, 
preached of a Native America unified against the encroaching British and called for all Native 
tribes to cast out the invading Europeans or else meet their doom.29  
Even the Wyandot, who had tipped off the British about a potential attack from the 
Seneca in 1761, could no longer suppress their animosity towards the British and began to rail 
against their abuses. Sandusky especially became a hotbed for Wyandot discontent, who 
complained to the commandant of the nearby fort that he “used them to[o] severe and bought 
their Land up.”30 Ironically, considering his earlier pro-British stance, Sastaretsy and his 
lieutenant, Takay, were the loudest among the Wyandot who came to oppose the British. The 
two other phatry chiefs, Babi and Téata, pushed for neutrality in the face of these tensions, but 
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neutrality became a less viable option with each passing day as Pontiac, an Odawa chief at 
Detroit, began to rally the tribes towards war.31  
Du Jaunay and Potier opposed any clash with the British and tried to smooth over 
tensions and aid the British before the war broke out. Du Jaunay wrote often to Gladwin at 
Detroit to inform him of the discontent of the Ojibwe at Michilimackinac.32 However, their 
advice went unheeded by colonial officials at least in part because of their innate distrust of the 
Jesuits. The Fort Sandusky commandant dismissed Wyandot complaints in 1762 as the “Lies of 
the old Pri[e]sts.”33 Their distrust was certainly not without merit. Father Richardie had rallied 
the Wyandot at Sandusky into ransacking the wares of nearby British traders a mere ten years 
before. The Jesuits by 1762 had far more to lose by opposing the British than by assisting them, 
but two years as allies could not erase the suspicion born from over 150 years of direct 
opposition.   
 
JESUIT DIPLOMACY AND THE SIEGE OF DETROIT, 1763 
In 1763, the Odawa chief Pontiac managed to unite thousands of Native men and women 
in the colonial west to take up the hatchet against the British in the hopes of restoring the French 
presence on the river. The Odawa, Potawatomi, and Chippewa of Detroit and the Ojibwe from 
Michilimackinac took up arms under his direct command while the Mingo, Delaware, Shawnee, 
and the Seneca of Pennsylvania and the Ohio River Valley lashed out under the spiritual 
influence of Neolin. Though none of the pays d’en haut tribes took up arms against Pontiac, two 
specific groups offered notable resistance to Pontiac’s War. The Odawa of Michilimackinac and 
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L’Arbre Croche never aided Pontiac, and the Wyandot of Detroit and Sandusky, whose support 
was either brief or mixed, had their own compelling reasons for opposing the war. It is no 
accident, however, that these two were the only remaining groups who hosted a Jesuit 
missionary. Du Jaunay and Potier both used the war as an opportunity to resume their earlier role 
as imperial diplomats and emissaries with notable success. 
The pays d’en haut erupted on May 7, 1763 when Pontiac and his allies attempted to 
capture Fort Detroit. Colonel Gladwin was tipped off to the plot and what would have been a 
sack instead became a protracted siege. Pontiac’s efforts enlisted all the Detroit tribes and about 
half of the Wyandot. Much as the Orontony affair had done over a decade earlier, the plan to take 
Detroit split the Wyandot into two factions. One part, led by Sastaretsy and Takay, took part in 
the initial attack with the. Sastaretsy himself played an important role in rallying the other tribes 
into action with the Onondaga and Oneida counting him among “the first disturbers of the 
peace.”34 The Wyandot at Sandusky chose to align primarily with Sastaretsy and attacked the 
British Fort Sandusky, killing all of its inhabitants except for the commandant, who they took 
captive. Another part, led by the elders Babi and Theata, refused to answer the initial call.35  
Catholicism majorly affected Wyandot behavior during the siege, even among the 
Pontiac-aligned Wyandot. The anti-war faction even refused to take part in any war until the 
Catholic feast day of the Ascension on May 12 had passed. Pontiac, however, refused to take no 
for an answer and continually pressured the neutral Wyandot to take part in the siege. The 
faction finally answered his call after Potier’s Ascension Day Mass, but their aid was half-
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hearted at best. Only fifty warriors from the Wyandot took part in a siege comprised of 875 
warriors.36  
 Potier became the loudest voice for peace outside of the besieged Fort Detroit. Pontiac 
and his allies had left him and most of the French habitants unmolested, but many French settlers 
outside the fort refused to aid him either directly or indirectly. Most of the French doubtless 
wished to simply be left alone and away from war, but Potier had additional motivation to pursue 
an end to the fighting. Potier understood that blame would fall immediately upon the French 
especially the Jesuits as the instigators of the attacks, even though they had nothing to gain from 
expelling the British and restoring French imperial presence. France had dissolved its branch of 
the Jesuit order, stripped them of their property, and expelled them from French lands. Two of 
Potier’s close friends, Salleneuve and Morinie, had been expelled as a result and Potier could not 
expect his situation to improve if the French returned. The British Empire was no friend to the 
Jesuit order, but the imperial regime in Quebec had refrained from dissolving the order unlike the 
French in Louisiana. Potier’s only hope to remain with his mission was for the British to retain 
their presence on the Detroit River. But Potier also needed to send a clear message to the British 
that he was an asset rather than a liability. To that end, Potier and his compatriot at 
Michilimackinac actively collaborated with British imperial authorities to absolve themselves of 
suspicion and to restore peace as quickly as possible.37  
 Potier gave a speech on May 14 to both the French habitants and Wyandot attending his 
mission that he would deny the holy sacrament to anyone who further aided Pontiac’s War, 
effectively excommunicating the pro-war faction as his predecessor Richardie had during the 
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Orontony crisis.38 The anti-war faction of the Wyandot had been loathe to participate from the 
beginning and would later claim to have only participated under duress. Babi and Theata’s 
faction believed it still had much to gain in allying with the British rather than opposing them 
like Sastaretsy and Takay’s group. The Wyandot had become the de facto representatives of the 
Detroit tribes under British rule. Potier’s declaration capitalized on their already-present feelings 
of discontent with the role forced upon them by their pro-war kin and Pontiac’s confederacy. On 
May 16, two days after Potier’s ultimatum, the majority of the Wyandot withdrew their support 
and joined Potier in calling for peace. Considering the Wyandot were so devotedly Catholic that 
they had refused to partake in the war before a special feast day, Potier’s declaration would have 
certainly influenced their timely decision to withdraw. The anti-war Wyandot sent a delegation 
to Detroit on May 22 to assert that they had only participated in the war due to Pontiac’s 
coercion and returned some captives as a show of good faith. Not all Wyandot stood down after 
Potier’s ultimatum, however, and a large portion of the tribe aligned with Pontiac through the 
rest of the year.39 
 Potier became a leader among the Detroit French in addition to his prominent place 
within the Wyandot tribe and brought this clout to bear in an attempt to prove his loyalty and 
bring about peace. On May 14, the same day he excommunicated the pro-war faction, Potier 
organized a delegation of French habitants on the south side of the river to beseech Pontiac to 
end the war. Like Potier, the French settlers understood that they were under suspicion from the 
British for instigating the conflict. The war itself was also dangerous and disruptive for their 
lives even if Pontiac never targeted the French due in part to him forcing the French to supply 
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him throughout the siege. Fearing for their future motivated Potier and his delegation to sue for 
peace to prove that they had a place in the British west. This first delegation met little success, 
but Potier persisted throughout June and July to petition for an end to the war.40  
 Meanwhile, the Ojibwe of Michilimackinac had chosen to support Pontiac. The Ojibwe 
took the fort by surprise on June 2, killing or capturing almost all of the soldiers and British 
traders and ransacking their wares and magazines for supplies. The Kiskakon Odawa, much like 
the Wyandot, had embraced Catholicism thanks to the efforts of the Jesuits stationed at the 
longstanding mission of St. Ignace. The Kiskakon Odawa were more numerous and independent 
than the Wyandot and resisted all coercion to take part in Pontiac’s plan. Because this branch of 
the Odawa refused to participate from the beginning, Du Jaunay took a different route to prove 
his worth to the British Empire. While Detroit’s social and political power centered on the 
military post at the fort, Michilimackinac’s social and political center rested in its Catholic 
church. Michilimackinac’s St. Anne’s Church, according to Keith Widder, “functioned like the 
hub of a wheel whose spokes fanned out across the pays d’en haut,” and the old Jesuit wielded 
political power as its pastor. Du Jaunay’s influence derived from his close relationship with the 
Odawa, his ability to represent their interests before the British, and his personal bravery and 
initiative to take action.41  
  When the Ojibwe broke into Fort Michilimackinac, Du Jaunay offered refuge to a dozen 
soldiers, including the commander, Captain George Etherington, preventing their capture and 
ultimately saving their lives. He sheltered them in his house within the fort until the fighting 
ended, then spirited them away to the Odawa at nearby L’Arbre Croche with aid from a 
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prominent French fur trader and soldier allied with the British named Charles Langlade. The 
Kiskakon Odawa, who had not been notified of a forthcoming attack, were outraged at their 
Ojibwe neighbors and offered shelter to the surviving British soldiers. The local Odawa chief, 
Bindanowan, and Etherington dispatched Du Jaunay alongside Langlade and the chief’s son, 
Kinonchamek, to inform Detroit of the fall of Michilimackinac, assure Gladwin of the Kiskakon 
Odawa’s allegiance, and to demand answers from Pontiac. Etherington was convinced that Du 
Jaunay would be essential for peace talks and vouched for the priest while begging Gladwin to 
send him back as soon as possible.42 
 Du Jaunay’s actions at Detroit demonstrate his two-fold role as both an emissary for the 
British and an ambassador to Pontiac. Gladwin received the delegation from Michilimackinac 
and trusted him enough to give him a war belt to give to the Ojibwe. This war belt held special 
symbolic importance in Euro-Native diplomacy as a physical representation of alliance. Du 
Jaunay did not depart immediately, however, as he had received a different set of tasks from 
Bindanowan to hold council with Pontiac. Pontiac agreed to the council where Du Jaunay 
pleaded for the future safety of British captives from Michilimackinac. Du Jaunay also relayed 
Bindanowan’s outrage at Pontiac’s actions and his demand for an explanation. Pontiac responded 
only by sending a ritual war hatchet with Du Jaunay to the Kiskakon Odawa, demanding they 
join in the rebellion. Du Jaunay returned to Michilimackinac as an emissary both to the Ojibwe 
and the British, as Gladwin tasked him with carrying a wampum belt to the Ojibwe to reaffirm 
their good faith with the British. Bindanowan accepted the gesture from Gladwin, but rejected 
that of Pontiac and threw his hatchet away.43  
                                                
42 “A Conference with Foreign Nations,” WJP 4: 476; Etherington to Gladwin, L’Arbre Croche, 
12 June 1763, MPHC 27: 632; Widder, Beyond Pontiac’s Shadow, 145. 
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 Meanwhile, dissension among the Wyandot began to undermine Pontiac’s attempts to 
cast out the British. Pontiac dispatched the Wyandot and the Potawatomi to capture the British 
fort at Presque Isle at the mouth of the Detroit River. Rather than kill the garrison, however, the 
Wyandot captured most of the soldiers and returned them to their village at Detroit. Dissent 
between pro-war and neutral Wyandot became acute when Pontiac-allied Wyandot killed two of 
the prisoners while the rest were released to take refuge in Fort Detroit.44  
Potier’s endeavors for a peaceful end to the conflict continued into July. He organized at 
least two more delegations of prominent habitants to petition Pontiac and kept an open line of 
communication with Fort Detroit despite the siege. Potier learned of another planned attack on 
Detroit Pontiac for July 5 and made ready to cross the river to inform the fort. Pontiac had had 
enough of the priest and the French’s unwillingness to lend him aid and threatened to destroy the 
mission and kill Potier if he continued to aid the fort. Potier did not remain cowed for long, 
however, and managed to send word to the fort on July 17 of another attack.45  
 
“RESOLUTIONS” 
 Pontiac’s siege continued to deteriorate through the summer and early autumn of 1763. 
The neutral Wyandot had abandoned the siege near the start, but the pro-war Wyandot finally 
departed shortly after the attack on Presque Isle. The remaining besieging tribes began to fall 
away as well until October 31, when Pontiac himself withdrew to the Maumee River to continue 
his war deep within the hinterlands. Pontiac’s withdrawal brought an end to the most intense 
stage of the war in the west. 
                                                
44 Christie to Bouquet, Detroit, 10 July 1763, Bouquet Papers 6: 301-303. 
45 Jehu Hay, “Diary of the Siege of Detroit,” 48-49; “Declaration of Mr. Jadoc to Major Gladwin 
and Capt. Grant at Major Gladwin’s House,” Detroit, 24 December 1763, MPHC 27: 656-657. 
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 Peace talks began in late 1763 and the Wyandot were among the first to come to terms. 
Though the Detroit Wyandot had established a formal peace in 1763, many of the pro-war 
Wyandot, including Sastaretsy and Takay, had fled to Sandusky and continued to fight in near 
Fort Pitt alongside the Mingo, Delaware, and Shawnee. Colonel Henry Bouquet dealt a serious 
military defeat to these tribes in 1763 at the Battle of Bushy Run, but the defeat had merely 
halted the Native offensive. The British military’s best efforts could not bring a decisive end to 
the conflict.46 
 The Sandusky Wyandot and the rest of the belligerent tribes came to terms during 
Colonel John Bradstreet’s 1764 expedition into the west. A delegation commissioned by 
“Sastaregi of the Hurons” that represented the Wyandot, Shawnee, Delaware, and Mingo met 
with Bradstreet after the colonel marched into the Ohio River Valley at the head of a large 
detachment of British soldiers. Bradstreet offered generous terms as he had with other belligerent 
tribes and, in exchange for the release of all British prisoners, promised to cease hostilities. 
Nevertheless, the Wyandot so feared retaliation and subjugation that they sent their terms of 
acquiescence during William Johnson’s final peace council through a messenger rather than risk 
attending the conference. The compliance of the Detroit Wyandot, however, still benefitted their 
kin. The Wyandot returned to the prominent position they had held on the Detroit River before 
1763. They assisted in bringing the Detroit Odawa to terms with the British and resumed their 
position as the spokespeople for the tribes of Detroit.47  
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 The end of 1763 also marked a firm end to the influence of the Jesuits in imperial affairs. 
Though the British refrained from holding the French legally responsible for Pontiac’s War, 
British officers and agents persisted in the belief that the interior French were the true instigators 
of the conflict. George Croghan, a prominent tradesman and an agent of Britain’s Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, remarked, “In the last Indian war the most part of the French were concerned in it 
… they have, therefor, great reason to be thankful to the British clemency in not bringing them to 
deserved punishment.” The British continued to view the Jesuits as the symbol of their inability 
to control the interior and as masterminds sparking insurrection in the “lazy, idle people” and the 
indigenous communities. The Jesuits’ actions during the war could not overwrite the pre-war 
prejudices of those officers they had aided.48  
Sir William Johnson believed expelling the Jesuits would aid the British empire in more 
ways than disposing of a subversive presence. Writing in January 1764, Johnson expressed: 
After all that can be said, we shall be liable to many Broils, till the French Inhabitants and 
Jesuits are removed, the latter (being no longer a society in France) we might very well 
appropriate their Lands to his Majesty’s Use. I dare fay they would be sufficient to endow 
a Bishoprick in Canada, and for good Missionaries, and I imagine an Episcopal 
Foundation in that Country would greatly Contribute to bring over the French, and make 
good Subjects of them in Time.49 
 
Also subscribing to the belief that Britain could never control the interior while it maintained a 
French population, Johnson saw an opportunity in Jesuit expulsion to further consolidate British 
control. Taking inspiration from the Catholic missionaries he despised, Johnson planned to 
deploy similarly trained British missionaries to replicate the attachment some indigenous 
communities felt for the Jesuits in order to further wed them to British rule.  
                                                
48 George Croghan, “Croghan’s Journal, 1765,” in Early Western Travels 1: 152; Calloway, 
Scratch of a Pen, 123. 
49 “Sir William Johnson to Lieut. Col. Eyre,” in Diary of the Siege of Detroit in the War with 
Pontiac, 236-237. 
 60 
Part of the peace terms for the Michilimackinac Ojibwe were to consent to the removal of 
all French fur traders and Jesuit missionaries from the fort, to which the Ojibwe consented. The 
Kiskakon Odawa, however, did not consent to the removal of their trusted missionary. They had 
fallen under suspicion despite never having aided Pontiac and had to argue their case before Sir 
William Johnson. Chief Bindanowan affirmed both his and Du Jaunay’s friendship to the British 
during the war, saying: 
I only heard a little bird Whistle an Acct of it & on going to Michilimackinac I found 
your people killed. Upon w[hi]ch I sent our Priest to inquire into the Cause of it. On the 
Priests return he bro[ugh]t me no favorable acc[oun]t, but a War hatchet from Pondiac 
w[hi]ch I scarcely looked on, & imediately threw away.50 
 
Despite these affirmations and the significant aid that Du Jaunay and the French had given to the 
British during the war, British high command under General Thomas Gage ordered that all 
French traders, settlers, and missionaries be removed from Michilimackinac. The commandant, 
holding a better understanding of the situation at Michilimackinac, saw no reason to comply with 
this and belayed the order. The French were allowed to remain at Michilimackinac, but their 
numbers remained too small for a tithe to support Du Jaunay’s mission. The old Jesuit retired to 
Quebec in 1765.51  
Though Potier had tried to reinsert himself in the imperial system as an ambassador 
during Pontiac’s War, the missionary never managed to reclaim the position he had under the 
French. Unlike Du Jaunay, Potier was allowed to remain at his post. His saving grace likely 
came from his attachment to the Wyandot, who were, to the British, “remarkable for their good 
sense and hospitality” with, “a particular attachment to the Roman Catholic religion, the French, 
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by their priests, having taken uncommon pains to instruct them.”52 Theata and a delegation of 
elders personally requested that Potier be allowed to remain among them during council on April 
29, 1764. Potier was allowed to remain the Wyandot missionary as he had under the French, but 
no effort was made to fund his mission.53 
Potier relied on tithing his Wyandot and French parishioners to fund the mission, but still 
found himself unable to cope with the costs. The war had left the Wyandot with few trade goods 
to help fund the mission, so they deeded a portion of their land to the mission. Potier, lacking the 
laborers needed to till the soil, sold the land to a French habitant. The Catholic bishop of Quebec 
provided a more lasting solution to support Potier’s missionary efforts. He established a parish 
on the southeast shore of the Detroit River to join the parish on the northwest shore adjoining the 
fort. Naming it the Parish of the Assumption and appointing Potier the pastor, the archdiocese of 
Quebec began to support the mission financially to prevent its closure. Potier never truly escaped 
financial hardship, but the additional support from the bishop and his appointment as a parish 
priest allowed him to continue his practice even after the international dissolution of the Jesuit 
order in 1773.54  
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CONCLUSION 
 The Society of Jesus and its black-robed missionaries rank among the most important and 
influential figures in early North American history. They spearheaded New France’s expansion 
by forging strong and lasting relationships with powerful indigenous communities. Their zeal for 
spreading their version of Roman Catholicism to indigenous communities pushed them deep into 
the interior and pushed them to contact peoples with which no other European had interacted. 
Perhaps alone of all the Europeans who chose to relocate to North America in the seventeenth 
century, the Jesuits could not count the possibility of material gain as one of their motivations. 
Many of the Black Robes crossed the Atlantic in the hopes of meeting a violent end and so 
receive an eternal reward as a martyr of the Christian religion. In this regard, at least, many 
found success.1 
 The Jesuit legacy in early North America is complicated, to say the least. In pushing 
deeper and further than most Europeans and through their sustained contact with the indigenous 
peoples of North America, they undoubtedly and unintentionally exacerbated the spread of 
infectious diseases that killed so many thousands of Native people. Their push for certain Native 
tribes to ally with New France involved them in the continental wars of European empires. Their 
constant drive to evangelize North America had them press for the dissolution and rejection of 
centuries-old Native traditions and spiritualties, though in this they found relatively little 
success.2 
 Historical narratives of New France tend to shift away from the Jesuit priests after the 
1660s as the French colonial project intensified and expanded, but the Jesuits occupied an 
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important place in the new phase of colonialism as they had of old. The missionaries had enjoyed 
a near monopoly of access to the indigenous communities of North America before Louis XIV 
converted New France into a royal colony. The Jesuits then contended with an imperial vision 
that often clashed with their own but could not dispense of their services or their expertise. 
Rather than limit themselves to decrying the liquor trade, spreading Catholicism, or regulating 
sexual interactions between Europeans and Natives, the Jesuits threw themselves into the 
transforming imperial enterprise of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. They 
adapted their previous methods of interacting with the indigenous communities to become 
powerful and influential diplomats who could often direct the course of intercultural discourse, 
interactions, and politics. In theory, they advised and aided their assigned indigenous 
communities while pushing the French colonial agenda. In practice, they maintained their own 
agenda based on what they saw as their overriding missionary obligations. They subverted or 
complicated relations between French and Natives if they felt their vision threatened, jealously 
defending their access to the tribes and limiting the access of parties they considered 
undesirable.3 
The pressures of rising imperial tensions during King George’s War and the Seven 
Years’ War led many of the tribes to which the Jesuits were assigned to adopt a more direct 
approach when dealing with European colonial empires. They began to eschew the use of the 
Jesuits as intermediaries and openly courted an alliance with the British that would render their 
political relationship with the Society of Jesus moot. Nevertheless, the few remaining Jesuits 
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would take up their old mantle as agents and arbitrators of empire during the crises of the British 
regime in the pays d’en haut.4 
The British conquest of New France created a powerful anxiety in the Jesuit missionaries 
over their place in the new regime. Fearful over their fate at British hands, some chose to flee to 
Louisiana and faced expulsion as their order was abolished in France. Others, such as Du Jaunay 
and Potier, resolved to make themselves valuable to the new order by encouraging the Natives 
and French settlers and fur traders to consent to British rule. Pontiac’s War provided them an 
opportunity to demonstrate their suspect loyalty to the new regime and to potentially reclaim a 
portion of their diplomatic power held previously under the French.  
 The British, ever suspicious of the black-robed priests who had opposed them for over a 
century, refused to grant the Jesuits their old prominence. While local officials at Detroit and 
Michilimackinac as well as tribal chiefs among the Wyandot and Kiskakon Odawa rediscovered 
the Jesuit potential to aid their cause, officials stationed in Quebec, New York, and Pennsylvania 
insulated from the direct conflict did not recognize their contributions, pushing instead to expel 
the Jesuits and all French-Canadians from the interior. Despite these suspicions, the interior 
French remained in their long-established position in the west. British fur traders needed them to 
act as middlemen between themselves and the western tribes due to the longstanding friendship 
and frequent kinship bonds between the French and the Natives. The interior French remained in 
the west well beyond the American Revolution.5  
The Jesuits, however, lost what little place they had left. Expelled from Louisiana and 
removed from their remaining enclaves at Kahnawake and Michilimackinac, the Jesuits who had 
roamed the interior and influenced empire and colonialism in French North America for over a 
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century disappeared from the continent outside of Detroit, Quebec, and Maryland. Though the 
order maintained a small presence in British Canada until the papal act of suppression in 1773, 
only Potier remained of the Jesuits in the pays d’en haut. 
Armand de la Richardie, after retiring to Quebec in 1751, became a professor at the Jesuit 
seminary college. He was eventually promoted as the seminary’s vice superior in 1755 and 
became the spiritual director at the Hotel-Dieu monastery in 1756. Richardie died in Quebec at 
age seventy-two in 1758, just one year before the capture of the city. Pierre du Jaunay was forced 
by financial circumstance to end his twenty-nine year tenure as missionary to the Odawa at 
Michilimackinac in 1765. He left a deep impression upon those Odawa who knew him, some of 
whom spoke of his missionary activities and prayers as late as 1824. He was appointed to be the 
spiritual director of the Ursulines at Quebec in 1767, a post he enjoyed until his death at age 
seventy-four in 1780.6 
Potier spent the rest of his life on the south shore of Detroit in what is now Windsor, 
Ontario. He was allowed to remain at his post after the international suppression of the Jesuits 
because Archbishop Briand appointed him the pastor of the Parish of the Assumption at Detroit. 
His parish grew so rapidly that he had to sell mission land to fund construction of a larger parish. 
Wyandot and French settlers worshiped alongside each other at the mission and Potier remained 
active as both a missionary to the tribe and a pastor to the French. Potier would have preferred 
focusing entirely upon his mission to the Wyandot, however. He tried to enlist Rev. Pierre 
                                                
6 Ernest J. Lajeunesse, “La Richardie, Armand de,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 3, 
accessed 5 February 2019; David A. Armour, “Du Jaunay, Pierre,” in in Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography, vol. 4, accessed 5 February 2019. 
 66 
Gibault as an associate pastor to minister to the French so he could focus all his effort on the 
Wyandot.7 
The British commandants eventually came to respect Potier as a decent man and called 
upon him to reaffirm the loyalties of the Detroit habitants during the American Revolution. 
Potier’s own loyalties during the Revolution are complex. While he called upon the habitants to 
honor their oaths of allegiance to the British Crown, he maintained a correspondence with an 
American patriot named John Dodge. He met Dodge when the man was held captive at Detroit 
during the war and maintained a correspondence even as Dodge aided George Rogers Clark’s 
famous expedition into the pays d’en haut. That expedition eventually captured the Detroit 
commandant and all his men at the Battle of Vincennes in 1779. Whether or not Potier aided the 
Americans directly or indirectly if at all, Potier speaking with the British and Americans from 
both corners of his mouth indicates his resolve to remain with his mission no matter who laid 
claim to the Detroit River.8 
Potier died in 1781 at the age of seventy-three after falling onto a fire poker that pierced 
his skull. Potier was deeply mourned by the French habitants and traders but his sudden passing 
especially aggrieved the Wyandot. The tribe mourned publically for the priest who ministered at 
Detroit for nearly thirty years. The principal chiefs called a council after a period of mourning 
and demanded a new missionary to fill the void, saying: 
My father, in the name of God & of all the Huron nations, help us in our present need of a 
missionary, the loss of Pere Poitier has left a general desolation in our villages, which 
will only cease when he is replaced by another. Instructed from infancy in the principles 
of the Christian religion, we follow them faithfully under the direction of our spiritual 
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leaders; but today what have we become? The souls of our warriors will tremble 
henceforth at the thought of death which follows them every moment, the blood of our 
old men & of our women will freeze at the approach of the last moment of their lingering 
lives, the mothers are distressed at the state of their children …9 
 
The British allowed Jean-François Hubert, a diocesan priest, to assume Potier’s old office later 
that same year.10  
The fate of the Wyandot follows an all-too familiar pattern through the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. More French and Anglo-American settlers relocated to Detroit as the 
eighteenth century progressed, putting more pressure on the Wyandot. They and the other Detroit 
tribes began to sell land to the newcomers, especially the French, until the newborn United States 
of America was granted possession of Detroit in 1797. The Wyandot remained neutral to 
imperial tensions during the American Revolution, but opted to oppose the Americans at the 
Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 and to side with the British and their allies, the Native 
confederacy organized and led by the Shawnee headman, Tecumseh. They aided in the capture 
of Detroit during the War of 1812. The Americans did not forget this or Tecumseh’s confederacy 
after the war’s conclusion gave Detroit back to the Americans. Subsequent federal laws 
progressively shrank Wyandot land holdings until the tribe was forced to relocate in the 1820s. 
Moving several times throughout the nineteenth century, the Wyandot tribe eventually settled in 
Oklahoma and Kansas, where their descendants live to this day.11 
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